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Illuminating Innumeracy 
Lisa Milot † 
“I know for me, I’m a lawyer because I was bad at [science and 
math]. All lawyers in the room, you know it’s true. We can’t 
add and subtract, so we argue.” * 
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Introduction 
It is an open secret that lawyers don’t like math. Tales of lawyers 
who chose the profession over business or medicine at least in part 
because of discomfort with math are legion, as are reports of math 
avoidance by lawyers once in the profession.1 Many lawyers treat 
 
†  Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. I 
thank Dan Coenen, Paul Heald, Scott Richert, Arden Rowell, and 
James Ryan for their invaluable comments, support, and guidance in 
researching and writing this Article. 
* Michelle Obama, Remarks by the First Lady at the National Science 
Foundation Family-Friendly Policy Rollout (Sept. 26, 2011). 
1. See Myrna S. Raeder, Cost-Benefit Analysis, Unintended Consequences, 
and Evidentiary Policy: A Critique and a Rethinking of the Application 
of a Single Set of Evidence Rules to Civil and Criminal Cases, 19 
Cardozo L. Rev. 1585, 1590 (1998) (“Unquestionably, math phobia 
was the impetus for many of us to attend law school, rather than pursue 
other professions.”); Martha Ann Sisson & Amy Leafe McCormack, 
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explicitly math-centric fields, such as tax law and bankruptcy, as 
impenetrable specialties to be avoided at all costs, segregated even on 
the judicial level with their own dedicated courts. With the exception 
of empirical articles and those employing an explicitly economic 
approach, most legal scholars avoid even the whiff of quantitative 
analysis in their writings, in part to avoid discouraging use of their 
ideas by lawyers, legislators, and judges uncomfortable with numerical 
notations and formulas.2 
To be clear, it is not only lawyers who struggle with numbers and 
their calculation. A 2003 study found that only 13% of American adults 
were “proficient” at quantitative tasks and that only 78% could 
perform even simple, single-step arithmetic.3 One study, even though it 
focused on college-educated individuals, found that nearly half of the 
subjects could not solve basic problems involving probabilities or 
convert percentages to proportions.4 Most of us fare little better in the 
real world; for example, we avoid financial calculations such as the 
amount needed for retirement, and we fail to assess and rebalance 
retirement portfolios.5 Innumeracy is widespread, even among the most 
educated and successful Americans. 
The profession of law, though, has embraced innumeracy in 
curious and significant ways that other professions have not. The Law 
School Admissions Test is the only major post-secondary admissions 
 
Success in 21st Century Private Practice: Retooling for an Enterprise 
Culture, UVA Law., Fall 2009, at 32, 33 (“Over the years, we have 
heard many lawyers muse that they would have attended business school 
if they were not math-phobic.”); see also Michelle Obama, Remarks by the 
First Lady at the National Science Foundation Family-Friendly Policy 
Rollout (Sept. 26, 2011). 
2. See, e.g., Thomas D. Lyon & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Relevance 
Ratio: Evaluating the Probative Value of Expert Testimony in Child 
Sexual Abuse Cases, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 43, 49 (1996) (“We . . . 
dispense with much of the mathematical notation which has discouraged 
even quantitatively minded jurists from applying the relevance ratio in a 
wider range of cases.”). 
3. Mark Kutner et al., Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, A First 
Look at the Literacy of America’s Adults in the 21st Century 
3–4 (2005). 
4. Isaac M. Lipkus et al., General Performance on a Numeracy Scale 
Among Highly Educated Samples, 21 Med. Decision Making 37, 39 
(2001). This study confirmed prior findings in less-educated populations. 
See id. at 38 (summarizing prior research). 
5. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated 
Disclosure, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 647, 728 (2011) (“Rather than choosing 
investments, employees often leave pension money wherever their 
employer puts it.”). 
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examination without a math component.6 Law students are assumed 
to lack mathematical backgrounds, and it is well accepted that they are 
not interested in understanding even basic mathematical concepts.7 
Moreover, many law professors share the math aversion of their 
students so that the numerical aspects of cases are often left 
unexplored in class or even edited out of casebooks. As a result, little 
math is found in the typical law school classroom. 
Not surprisingly, law students who are uncomfortable with math 
become lawyers who self-identify as “bad at math.” Indeed, innumer-
acy is at times almost celebrated within the legal profession. Lawyers 
bond openly over their distaste for math and accept the same in 
others. Those who are competent at—or even enjoy—math are seen 
as an oddity. Only occasionally is the profession’s math paralysis 
criticized or even questioned.8 
That lawyers are bad at math has become a truism, so that 
whether we are actually bad at math is subsumed by our image of 
 
6. See Mary Ann Glendon, A Nation Under Lawyers: How the 
Crisis in the Legal Profession is Transforming American 
Society 202–03 (1994) (providing an overview of the types of 
intelligence for which the Law School Admissions Test evaluates). While 
the Medical College Admission Test no longer has a separate 
quantitative analysis section, basic mathematical competence, including 
arithmetic, calculation of percentages, calculation of proportions, and 
estimates of square roots, is tested as part of the biological and physical 
sciences sections of the exam. Physical and Biological Sciences Cognitive 
Skills, Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls. 4 (2012), https://www.aamc.org/ 
students/download/285238/data/phyandbiocogskills.pdf. 
7. For a more complete discussion of law students, law school, and math, 
see infra Part III. 
8. For example, in noting that the symposium for which his paper was 
written was held in 1997 and marked the anniversary of legislation 
signed into law in 1986, Professor David Hyman stated that “Only 
lawyers, whose inadequacies in mathematics are well-documented, could 
conclude that the symposium marked [the legislation’s] tenth 
anniversary.” David A. Hyman, Patient Dumping and EMTALA: Past 
Imperfect/Future Shock, 8 Health Matrix 29, 29 n.1 (1998). On a 
more technical level, in analyzing Internal Revenue Code § 673, which 
provides that a grantor is treated as the owner of a trust in which he 
has retained a reversion if, at the time the trust is funded, the reversion 
is greater than 5% of the value of the portion of the trust to which the 
reversion applies, Lawrence Katzenstein described a statutory exception 
as being “included for the benefit of lawyers who aren’t good at math,” 
since the described scenario could never exceed the 5% threshold. 
Lawrence P. Katzenstein, Planning with Grantor Trusts, in Estate 
Planning in Depth 1053, 1058 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, June 23–
28, 2002), WL SG094 ALI-ABA 1053; cf. Lyon & Koehler, supra note 
2, at 49 n.26 (listing Judge Jack Weinstein and Judge Frank 
Easterbrook as “notable exceptions in an otherwise remarkably math-
phobic population” of judges). 
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ourselves—and others’ image of us—as such.9 Yet lawyers in all types 
of practices must grapple with mathematical issues.10 Are we competent 
to do so?11 If at least a sizable portion of the bar is innumerate, why is 
this the case—is it objective math competence or subjective math 
confidence that we lack? And, either way, are our mathematical 
failings corrected by the checks and balances of legal practice and the 
legal system, or should we, as members of the legal profession, change 
our approach to math? 
Innumeracy is an issue we must confront: numerical information 
is pervasive and calculations are central to the practice of many areas 
of law.12 Yet many math mistakes in the law and legal practice 
remain unacknowledged and uncorrected because in our discomfort 
with numbers we assign undue weight to them, lack the language to 
engage with numerical ideas, and limit our ability to represent our 
clients with respect to some of the more interesting and novel legal 
issues arising in our technological world.13 Ultimately, innumeracy 
prevents us from thinking critically about the information and 
assumptions underlying numbers and compromises transparency and 
comprehensibility in the law, undermining legal authority. 
To date, academic attention has focused primarily on the innumer-
acy of jurors14 and of the American public generally.15 But the spotlight 
 
9. An internet search with the terms “lawyer” and “bad at math” returns 
approximately 883,000 hits. http://www.google.com/ (search “lawyer” 
“bad at math”) (last visited Feb. 13, 2013). 
10. See infra Part II. 
11. Intriguingly, a preliminary empirical study of the numeracy of law 
students shows that they are both better and worse at math than 
graduate students in other fields. The study suggests that while many law 
students have a high degree of numeracy, a troubling number (3%)—more 
than in other programs—is genuinely innumerate: incapable of correctly 
answering even a single, simple arithmetic problem. See Arden Rowell & 
Jessica L. Bregant, Numeracy and Legal Decisionmaking (Ill. Pub. Law 
& Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 13-29, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2163645. 
12. See infra Part III. 
13. See infra Part III. 
14. See, e.g., Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic 
Damages, and the Goals of Tort Law, 57 SMU L. Rev. 163 (2004) 
(discussing jury difficulties calculating awards for pain and suffering); 
Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the 
Legal Process, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329 (1971) (noting the danger of jury 
overvaluation of numerical analysis). 
15. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 5 (exploring the failure of 
mandated disclosure laws to protect personal autonomy, in part because 
of the high rate of consumer innumeracy); Susan Block-Lieb, Mandatory 
Protections as Veiled Punishments: Debtor Education in H.R. 975, The 
Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2003, 69 Brook. L. 
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has rarely been focused where it belongs: on practicing lawyers16 and 
lawmakers,17 as well as law students and the law professors who 
prepare them for their future roles in the legal community. In this 
Article, I distinguish between three types of mathematical errors 
commonly made by lawyers: miscalculations, oversimplifications, and 
misapplications of mathematical principles. I argue that these errors 
matter because of the centrality of numerical information to the 
practice of many areas of law. In order to better understand the origins 
of this innumeracy and begin to move towards a more numerate 
approach to the law, I distinguish objective innumeracy—a lack of 
math competence—from subjective innumeracy—a lack of math 
confidence. Finally, I conclude by offering practical suggestions for 
beginning to overcome innumeracy in the legal profession. Dealing head 
on with these fundamental challenges holds the promise of greatly 
improving how we think about and practice law. 
 
Rev. 425 (2004) (debtor education); Christopher C. Fennell & Lee Anne 
Fennell, Fear and Greed in Tax Policy: A Qualitative Research Agenda, 
13 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 75 (2003) (taxpayer filing decisions); David 
Adam Friedman, Free Offers: A New Look, 38 N.M. L. Rev. 49 (2008) 
(debtor disclosures); Bailey Kuklin, Probability Misestimates in Medical 
Care, 59 Ark. L. Rev. 527 (2006) (medical risk assessments); Ann 
Morales Olazábal & Howard Marmorstein, Structured Products for the 
Retail Market: The Regulatory Implications of Investor Innumeracy and 
Consumer Information Processing, 52 Ariz. L. Rev. 623 (2010) 
(investor innumeracy). 
16. A rare exception is Professor Laurence Tribe’s 1971 article critiquing a 
prosecutor’s incorrect use of probabilistic evidence in a criminal trial. 
See Tribe, supra note 14, at 1335–38. For further discussion of this case, 
see infra notes 72–78 and accompanying text. 
17. In a few instances, commentators have discussed mathematical errors by 
judges. See, e.g., Paul H. Edelman, Getting the Math Right: Why 
California Has Too Many Seats in the House of Representatives, 59 
Vand. L. Rev. 297 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court made a 
math error in United States Department of Commerce v. Montana, 503 
U.S. 442 (1992)); David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-
Finding”: Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541 (1991) (reviewing the Supreme 
Court’s use of empirical research in constitutional interpretation); 
Michael I. Meyerson & William Meyerson, Significant Statistics: The 
Unwitting Policy Making of Mathematically Ignorant Judges, 37 Pepp. 
L. Rev. 771 (2010) (analyzing areas of the law where the “mathematical 
ignorance” of judges has subverted legal goals); Lars Noah, An 
Inventory of Mathematical Blunders in Applying the Loss-of-a-Chance 
Doctrine, 24 Rev. Litig. 369 (2005) (cataloguing instances of 
computational and conceptual errors in the calculation of “loss of a 
chance” damages in tort law). 
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I. Enumerating Legal Innumeracy 
Lawyers’ discomfort with numbers and their calculation can be 
seen in the ways we approach mathematical issues in the law. As an 
initial matter, in many instances lawyers simply avoid math. 
At times, this avoidance reflects our wariness about the potential 
for laypersons to assign undue weight to numerical evidence. So, for 
example, in People v. Collins,18 mathematics professor Daniel Martinez 
provided expert testimony concerning probability theory in an effort to 
establish the likelihood that the defendants in question had committed 
the crime with which they were charged. Upon appeal, the California 
Supreme Court expressed concern with the power of probabilistic 
evidence and warned that “[m]athematics, a veritable sorcerer in our 
computerized society, while assisting the trier of fact in the search for 
truth, must not cast a spell over him.”19 In particular, the court worried 
that the jury lacked the competence to properly contextualize the 
probabilistic evidence with which it had been presented and, as a 
result, overvalued it in deciding the defendants’ guilt.20 
Professor Laurence Tribe has since expanded on this concern,21 
criticizing the use of “explicitly statistical evidence or overtly 
probabilistic arguments” at trial.22 A mathematician himself,23 Tribe 
believes that the risk that jurors might overvalue numerical data due 
to the precision and “overbearing impressiveness of numbers” is too 
great.24 Thus, he prefers that jurors be allowed to make inductive 
inferences rather than be presented with explicitly quantified 
information.25 Later commentators have echoed this idea.26  
18. People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968) (en banc). 
19. Id. at 33. In addition to the concern with overvaluation, the court 
reviewed the many factual errors made by the prosecution at trial, 
producing meaningless calculations of probability. See George Fisher, 
Evidence 73 (2d ed. 2008); see also infra notes 72–78 and 
accompanying text. 
20. Collins, 438 P.2d at 40. The court pointed to flaws in the evidence 
presented but reserved its harshest criticism for the power of 
mathematics in the courtroom. 
21. Professor Tribe was, in fact, the architect behind the Collins opinion. At 
the time of the decision, he clerked for Justice Tobriner who assisted in 
drafting the opinion. See Fisher, supra note 19, at 73 (detailing Tribe’s 
role in assisting Justice Tobriner). 
22. Tribe, supra note 14, at 1330. 
23. Professor Tribe graduated summa cum laude in Mathematics from 
Harvard College prior to his legal career. Laurence H. Tribe, Harvard 
L. Sch., http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/index.html?id= 
74 (last visited Feb. 13, 2013). 
24. Tribe, supra note 14, at 1361. 
25. Id. at 1331 & n.2. 
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At other times, math avoidance may reflect a conscious legal 
strategy, born of a belief that “[a]necdotal evidence is vivid and 
reaches us in a way that . . . statistical information cannot.”27 In this 
view, storytelling is a preferred advocacy tactic, providing context and 
color, and thus a saliency to the jury, in a way numbers cannot. For 
example, Michael Saks and Robert Kidd have argued that: 
Research demonstrates . . . that people do not process 
probabilistic information well, that in the face of particularistic 
information, they cannot integrate the statistical and anecdotal 
evidence and consequently tend to ignore the statistical 
information. Intuitive, heuristic, human decision makers must 
dispense with certain information, and that tends strongly to be 
the quantitative information. While commentators’ arguments 
have been that the data are inordinately persuasive, the 
evidence says the reverse is true.28  
This reasoning resonates with the actual experience of jurors in 
Collins, who later reported that they had disregarded Professor 
Martinez’s testimony in reaching the verdict, focusing instead on the 
evidence provided by eyewitnesses to the crime.29 
This research illustrates that math avoidance can be a conscious 
technique used by lawyers to develop a persuasive narrative that 
avoids confusion or the misinterpretation of numerical evidence by 
laypersons charged with legal decision making. But that is just the tip 
of the iceberg with regard to math avoidance in the law: as other 
 
26. See, e.g., Leonard R. Jaffee, Prior Probability—A Black Hole in the 
Mathematician’s View of the Sufficiency and Weight of Evidence, 9 
Cardozo L. Rev. 967 (1988) (arguing ardently against the use of 
probabilistic evidence); Richard O. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 
Mich. L. Rev. 1021 (1977) (agreeing with Tribe as an initial matter 
that the costs of using probabilistic evidence in the fact-finding process 
at trial outweigh the benefits of such use); see also David McCord, A 
Primer for the Nonmathematically Inclined on Mathematical Evidence 
in Criminal Cases: People v. Collins and Beyond, 47 Wash. & Lee L. 
Rev. 741 (1990) (providing an overview of the issues and arguments 
concerning probabilistic evidence and the associated case law and social 
science research). 
27. Panel on Statistics Assessments as Evidence in the Courts, 
Nat’l Research Council, The Evolving Role of Statistical 
Assessments as Evidence in the Courts 154 (Stephen E. Fienberg 
ed., 1989). 
28. Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and 
Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 Law & Soc’y Rev. 123, 149 
(1980–1981). 
29. See Fisher, supra note 19, at 72. 
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commentators have noted, lawyers often avoid math simply because 
they are uncomfortable with it.30 
Avoidance, though, is not the primary problem. Instead, the 
central issue is that when lawyers do math,31 they often do it badly. 
Indeed, the ways innumeracy manifests itself are so varied and 
overlapping that any taxonomy of the problem is necessarily 
incomplete. But it is worth parsing the types of numerical errors 
lawyers most commonly make in order to better understand the 
reasons for them and identify those that are most in need of systemic 
correction. Three problems are of particular importance due to their 
pervasiveness and the ways in which they compromise transparency in 
the law and, thus, undermine the legitimacy of our legal system: 
(1) persistent computational errors, (2) the reduction of complex 
calculations to overly simplistic formulas that obscure their failure to 
accomplish their intended goals, and (3) the production and use of 
meaningless data through fundamental misunderstandings of the 
principles underlying mathematical calculations. 
A. Innumeracy Through Miscalculation 
Computational errors are the simplest of math mistakes: for 
example, a figure is calculated incorrectly, numbers are transposed, or 
addition is performed rather than multiplication. In many instances, 
such errors are caught quickly, before they become of any significance. 
However, when errors are not self-evident, a lawyer must be secure 
enough with numbers to think critically about them so as to ensure 
that an apparent result is in fact the actual result. 
Sometimes individuals do not have the basic tools to think 
critically about numbers. In his bestseller about the existence and 
consequences of innumeracy, mathematics professor John Allen Paulos 
catalogued Americans’ difficulties with identifying internal 
inconsistencies in calculations because of difficulties with estimation 
and scale.32 For example, Paulos analyzes the story of Noah’s Ark 
 
30. For example, in an article for young practitioners, Scheherazade Fowler 
comments on “lawyers who try really hard to not look too closely at 
numbers, who accept the accountant’s numbers blindly, whose eyes 
glaze over at spreadsheets and balance sheets.” Scheherazade Fowler, 
Journal of a Young Lawyer, Law Prac. Today (Mar. 2005), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/lpm/lpt/articles/mgt03054.html. 
31. In fact, in some instances math cannot be avoided as the substance of 
the controversy is itself mathematical—for example, the calculation of 
damages or the valuation of a company. Professor Tribe specifically 
excepts such cases from his criticisms of the use of math at trial. Tribe, 
supra note 14, at 1338. 
32. John Allen Paulos, Innumeracy: Mathematical Illiteracy and 
Its Consequences 7–32 (paperback ed. 2001). 
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from the Book of Genesis for mathematical possibility.33 For water 
deep enough to cover the world’s mountains, he calculates that at 
least half a billion cubic miles of rain would need to fall in the allotted 
forty-day period.34 On an hourly basis, this is a rate of rainfall of at 
least fifteen feet per hour, more than sufficient to sink an aircraft 
carrier—or a fully-loaded ark.35 Thus simple mathematical estimations 
and calculations and a sense of scale—of what fifteen feet of rain an 
hour looks like—clarifies that the story cannot be literally true. 
As a more practical and legal example of this sort of problem, 
Professor Allan Felsot has critiqued policymakers’ “inability to grasp 
the magnitude of numbers” with respect to the level of contaminants 
in the environment.36 As such, lawmakers cannot distinguish between 
levels that are biologically significant and those that are not, leading 
them to impose completely impractical requirements for contaminant 
management.37 When lawyers fail to understand the context of 
numbers, they lose the ability to think critically about them, and the 
results can prove nonsensical. 
Absent a sense of how numbers should work and an interest in 
engaging with them, moreover, errors that should be easily correctable 
often become legally significant.38 Take, for example, the calculation 
of the value of an interest in a family limited partnership (FLP)39 for 
gift and estate tax purposes. A common estate-planning tool, an FLP 
transforms assets that were once wholly owned and freely transferable 
by a taxpayer into interests in an illiquid company.40 Since a buyer 
 
33. Id. at 16–17. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Allan S. Felsot, Numbers, Numbers Everywhere—And Not a Drop of 
Meaning, 13 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 91, 91 (1998). 
37. See id. at 92 (discussing how “regulatory standards have begun to 
overreach the true significance of the numbers”). 
38. In fact, innumeracy of this sort is often behind malpractice actions 
against attorneys. See Julie A. Goren, Getting the Date Right, Cal. 
Law., Dec. 2010, at 39, 39 (reporting that the American Bar 
Association has identified calendaring and deadline-related errors as a 
leading cause of attorney malpractice actions including, among others, 
miscounting the days until a deadline expired). 
39. Ostensibly referring only to “limited partnerships,” FLPs may in fact be 
created as limited liability companies, business trusts, or other closely-
held business entities. While the details of the entity and capitalization 
structure differ depending on the type of entity employed, the basic 
technique and calculation of discounts are the same. As used in this 
Article, “FLP” is a term of art independent of the entity type. 
40. See James R. Repetti, Minority Discounts: The Alchemy in Estate and 
Gift Taxation, 50 Tax L. Rev. 415, 452–58 (1995) (containing a critical 
discussion of the use of FLPs in estate planning). 
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would pay less for such a restricted interest than for outright 
ownership of the underlying assets, the successful use of an FLP 
depresses the taxable value of the asset.41 Thus, when a taxpayer 
transfers interests in the FLP to his children or other intended 
beneficiaries, he pays tax on the lower value of the FLP interest 
rather than on the value of the assets he transferred to the FLP in 
the first instance. 
To illustrate this technique, consider the valuation of one share of 
common stock that is traded on the New York Stock Exchange. 
Because the stock is publicly traded, its tax valuation is 
straightforward: simply find the mean of its high and low trading 
values on the day in question.42 Compare this value to that of an 
interest in an FLP that holds shares of publicly traded stock. Because 
the FLP interest is not regularly sold on any established market, 
there is no high or low value to average. Instead, its value for tax 
purposes is based on “all relevant factors,” including the FLP’s net 
asset value and demonstrated earning capacity, the economic outlook 
for its particular business, and the value of the securities of 
comparable companies that are publicly traded.43 
If we assume the FLP interest being valued represents 10% of the 
interests in the company, at first blush the value of the interest 
should be worth 10% of the overall value of the FLP. But finding an 
unrelated buyer for the interest at this price would most likely be 
impossible: the buyer would have no guarantee of receiving any return 
on his investment, could not determine the FLP’s investment or 
dividend policy, and would not even be able to determine who would 
manage the company’s investments. Moreover, finding a subsequent 
buyer for the interest would prove difficult if the initial buyer decided 
against holding the investment at some point in the future. As such, a 
buyer would expect to pay something less than 10% of the FLP’s 
overall value for the interest. 
Thus, in most instances the value of an FLP interest must be 
discounted from a proportionate portion of the FLP’s overall value. 
Where the interest being valued represents less than a controlling 
interest in the company, its value is often discounted to reflect its 
 
41. See Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-2(a), 25.2512-2(a) (as amended in 1992 and 
1976, respectively) (establishing that the value of an interest for gift and 
estate tax purposes is its fair market value on the valuation date). 
42. See Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-2(b)(1), 25.2512-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1992 
and 1976, respectively) (establishing that the mean between the highest 
and lowest selling price on the date of the gift is the fair market value 
per share). 
43. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-3, 25.2512-3(a) (as amended in 1992 and 1960, 
respectively). See also Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-2(f), 25.2512-2(f) (as 
amended in 1992 and 1976, respectively) (listing factors); Rev. Rul. 59-
60, 1959-1 C.B. 237 (same). 
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holder’s lack of control.44 Moreover, where the value of the company 
was initially determined by comparison to publicly-traded companies 
in a similar business, a discount accounting for the comparative 
difficulty in selling the privately-held FLP interest is appropriate.45 In 
each case, the appropriate adjustment is generally determined by 
appraisal. 
Taken as a whole, the valuation of an interest in a company that 
is not publicly traded involves a series of high-stakes judgment calls 
that can substantially reduce the taxable value of a taxpayer’s 
interest in a company,46 and thus his tax burden. As a result, estate-
planning attorneys are careful in their related documentation and 
calculations. Yet miscalculations in this realm are legion. 
The most common error reflected in the case law involves the 
application of discounts for lack of control and lack of marketability 
to the same underlying FLP value. As with any set of discounts, the 
proper calculation involves a sequential application of the discounts.47 
For illustration, consider a $100 item that was initially marked down 
by 30%, and then by a further 20%. Its final marked-down price can 
be found by calculating the initial discount and subtracting this 
amount from the initial price, then calculating the second discount on 
this initial marked-down price and subtracting it from this 
intermediate price.48 Thus: 
 
44. This is often termed a “lack of control” or “minority” discount. See, 
e.g., Estate of Kelley ex rel. Louden v. Comm’r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 369, 
372 (2005) (“A minority discount will therefore apply . . . where a 
partner lacks control.”). Alternatively, where the interest is a controlling 
one, a “control interest premium” may be appropriate if the initial 
valuation did not assume control. See Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-2(e), 
25.2512-2(e) (as amended in 1992 and 1976, respectively) (“[I]f the block 
of stock to be valued represents a controlling interest . . . the price at 
which other lots change hands may have little relation to its true 
value.”). 
45. This is commonly called a “discount for lack of marketability.” See 
generally Mukesh Bajaj et al., Firm Value and Marketability Discounts, 
27 J. Corp. L. 89, 100–03 (2001). 
46. See Louis A. Mezzullo, Valuation of Corporate Stock, 831-3d Tax Mgmt. 
Portfolios (BNA), at B-101–02 (2010) (showing lack of control 
discounts up to 35% and lack of marketability discounts of up to 50% in 
a selection of 77 reported cases). 
47. See Gary R. Trugman, Understanding Business Valuation: A 
Practical Guide to Valuing Small to Medium-Sized Businesses 
286–87 (1998). 
48. Because of the commutative property, the answer is the same regardless 
of the order in which the discounts are applied. Thus, a $100 item that 
is first marked down by 20% and then by 30% yields the same final 
marked-down price as one that is first marked down by 30% and then 
by 20%. 
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initial sales price  $100 
less initial discount ($100 × 30%) - $30 
initial marked-down price  $70 
less second discount ($70 × 20%) - $14 
final marked down price  $56 
 
The resulting total mark-down in percentage terms is 44%.49 
Similarly, where a block of stock is appropriately subject to a 30% 
lack of control discount and a 20% discount for lack of marketability, 
its total applicable discount is the same 44%. Yet lawyers, judges, and 
law students all frequently incorrectly calculate the overall discount. 
In some instances, the discounts are added together to produce a total 
applicable discount of 50%.50 In others, the final marked-down price 
and discount are transposed; thus the taxable value is reported as $44 
instead of $56.51 In still others, the discounts are combined in a way 
that defies explanation and thus is only attributable to a 
miscalculation.52 
Each of these mistakes is easy to catch and correct for an 
attorney comfortable with numbers and their calculation. For 
example, when one recognizes that discounts are multiplicative rather 
than additive, even a quick review should reveal that discounts of 
30% and 20% cannot yield an overall discount of 50%. Yet these sorts 
of errors may well evade notice by lawyers unaccustomed to 
 
49. This is calculated as: $100 initial price − $56 final price = $44 total 
discount. The percentage discount is: $44 total discount  = 0.44 = 44%. 
50. See, e.g., Estate of Bailey ex rel. Foster v. Comm’r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1862 (2002) (claiming incorrectly that discounts of 20% and 40% yielded 
an overall discount of 60%); Estate of Barudin ex rel. Clarke v. Comm’r, 
72 T.C.M. (CCH) 488 (1996) (asserting that discounts of 26% and 19% 
yielded a total discount of 45%); cf. Dickerson v. Comm’r, 103 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1280 (2012) (erroneously discounting the valuation of the gift of 
lottery proceeds made by the taxpayer by a total of 67%, based on 
individual discounts of 65% and 2%). 
51. Cf. Repetti, supra note 40, at 425 (“A few confused courts initially 
valued the corporation assuming control and then added a control 
premium to the controlling block, in effect, double counting for the 
premium.” (footnote omitted)). 
52. For example, in Estate of Kelley ex rel. Louden v. Commissioner, 90 
T.C.M. (CCH) 369, 370 (2005), the taxpayers claimed discounts of 38% 
for lack of marketability and of 25% for lack of control. Without 
explanation, their counsel repeatedly asserted that these discounts 
together produced a total discount of 55.15%. Id. at 370 n.1. As the 
court noted, this assertion contradicted the actual total discount—
53.5%—correctly applied by the appraiser in calculating the taxable 
value of the interest. Id. Ultimately, the court correctly applied the 
adjusted discounts it allowed. Id. at 373–74. 
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estimating and thinking critically about numbers, causing serious 
harm to their clients.53 
B. Innumeracy Through Oversimplification 
Complex numerical ideas frequently defy simplification. This has 
not, however, prevented lawyers and lawmakers from seeking to 
express complex mathematical concepts in simple terms, even when 
the result makes no economic sense. 
One example of an oversimplified formula is that for the division 
of equity in homes that are classified as hybrid property upon a 
couple’s divorce.54 “Hybrid property” is property owned by a couple 
that has both separate and marital components,55 often because of its 
acquisition with a combination of premarital and postmarriage funds. 
Homes that are purchased prior to marriage, with later mortgage 
payments made with income earned during the marriage, epitomize 
hybrid property. 
In determining how much of a hybrid-property home’s equity 
should be allocated to one spouse’s separate estate and how much to 
the marital estate upon divorce, many courts look to the “source of the 
 
53. The result of these mistakes might be the overpayment of tax or the 
imposition of penalties and interest for an underpayment. In either case, 
the mistake can trigger an audit—with the associated emotional and legal 
costs. See infra notes 118–21 and accompanying text for further discussion 
of these issues. Even where caught by an attorney, there can be negative 
repercussions for clients. See, e.g., DeCurtins v. DeCurtins, Nos. 92 CA 2, 
92 CA 44, 1993 WL 211348, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. June 16, 1993) 
(correcting defendant’s attorney’s simple $19,500 miscalculation in a 
property settlement agreement only after several years of appeals). 
54. For further examples of oversimplification in the law in response to 
mathematical complexity, see F. Russell Denton & Paul J. Heald, 
Random Walks, Non-Cooperative Games, and the Complex Mathematics 
of Patent Pricing, 55 Rutgers L. Rev. 1175, 1181–93 (2003) 
(analyzing the prevailing patent-valuation methods and finding them 
overly simplistic), and A New Formula for Divorce, with Uneven Results, 
Wall St. J. (Mar. 11, 2012, 10:30 PM), http://live.wsj.com/video/ 
EBE6C620-C3DA-4EFC-AF7C-F6702B34EA6B.html (featuring Judge 
Sondra Miller (retired) of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court 
of New York criticizing the state’s statutory formula for setting 
predivorce alimony and explaining that the formula, through 
oversimplification, produces perverse and unexpected consequences when 
applied to certain more affluent couples). Cf. Meyerson & Meyerson, 
supra note 17 (critiquing the initial presumption in paternity cases that, 
prior to testing, the defendant has a 50% chance of being the father; the 
focus on race in DNA matching, regardless of its relevance to the crime 
committed; and the reduction of damages to plaintiffs who are women 
or members of a racial minority group). 
55. Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and 
Recommendations § 4.03 (2002); 1 Brett R. Turner, Equitable 
Distribution of Property § 5:28 (3d ed. 2005).  
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funds” used to acquire equity in the property.56 They then divide that 
equity between the estates based on their contributions.57 The ultimate 
goal is to return the invested funds to the estate that provided them, 
along with a return that fairly allocates the appreciation in the home’s 
value during the time it was owned by the couple.58 
The most often-used formula for this division is expressed 
algebraically as:  
nmc/tc × e = nonmarital property,59 
where nmc is the total of the nonmarital (separate) contributions to 
the home’s equity,60 tc is the total amount contributed by both the 
separate and marital estates, and e is the home’s net equity at the 
time the marriage is dissolved.61 After calculating the separate estate’s 
share of the equity pursuant to this formula, all remaining equity is 
allocated to the marital estate. 
 
56. See Brett R. Turner, Virginia’s Equitable Distribution Law: Active 
Appreciation and the Source of Funds Rule, 47 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 
879, 890 (1990). 
57. See id. (“[W]hen property is acquired with marital and separate funds, 
the ratio between the marital and separate interests is the ratio between 
the marital and separate contributions.”). 
58. See, e.g., Maddox v. Maddox, 604 S.E.2d 784, 786 (Ga. 2004) 
(expressing that each estate should receive a fair and proportionate 
return on its investment in the home); Hall v. Hall, 462 A.2d 1179, 1181 
(Me. 1983) (same); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 614 A.2d 988, 993 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1992) (same); In re Marriage of Herr, 705 S.W.2d 619, 624 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (same); Wade v. Wade, 325 S.E.2d 260, 269 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1985) (same); Smoot v. Smoot, 4 Va. Cir. 182, 190 (Va. Cir. 
Ct. 1984) (same). 
59. The court in Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d 871, 872–74 (Ky. 
Ct. App. 1981), explicated this formula. Georgia, Missouri, Virginia, and 
West Virginia have also adopted it. Snowden v. Alexander-Snowden, 
587 S.E.2d 54, 55–56 (Ga. 2003); In re Herr, 705 S.W.2d at 625; Hart v. 
Hart, 497 S.E.2d 496, 505 (Va. Ct. App. 1998); Whiting v. Whiting, 396 
S.E.2d 413, 422 (W. Va. 1990). 
60. Nonmarital contributions are the equity in the home at the time of 
marriage together with any later payments from separate funds towards 
the mortgage principal and the value of any improvements made to the 
home that were paid from separate funds. “Marital contributions” equal 
amounts paid after marriage to reduce the mortgage principal and the 
value of any improvements made to the property after marriage, in each 
case paid for from funds that are not one spouse’s separate property.  
See Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d at 872 (providing definitions for the terms 
in the formula).  
61. Dissolution can either be the time of separation or divorce, depending on 
state law. If the home is sold prior to that time, e equals the net 
proceeds from the sale. See id.  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 3·2013 
Illuminating Innumeracy 
783 
Consider, for example, a $250,000 home purchased by an 
unmarried individual using conventional financing.62 At purchase, the 
downpayment is $50,000 and the mortgage balance is $200,000. 
Assuming the homeowner pays $5,000 of the principal of the loan 
prior to marriage two years later63 and the value of the home stays 
constant, the homeowner’s nonmarital contributions (nmc) total 
$55,000.64 If the couple makes mortgage principal payments of $20,000 
during their six year marriage, as well as an additional lump sum 
payment of $35,000 near the end of the marriage, the total 
contributions (tc) to the home’s equity equals $110,000.65 If the home 
appreciates to be worth $500,000 at the time of divorce, its net equity 
(e) at that time is $360,000.66 
Using the above formula, the value allocated to the separate 
estate is: 
($55,000/$110,000) × $360,000 = $180,000. 
The remaining home equity—$180,00067—is allocated to the marital 
estate. This makes intuitive sense, since each estate contributed an 
equal amount to the home’s equity and thus should receive an equal 
portion of the available equity. 
Yet it makes no economic sense. Each estate’s interest is 
misvalued under the formula because it allocates an identical return 
 
62. The conventional financing for a home purchase is provided by a 20% 
down payment and a 30-year fully amortized mortgage. See Matthew 
Chambers et al., Accounting for Changes in the Homeownership Rate, 
50 Int’l Econ. Rev. 677, 700–01 (2009).  
63. This is the typical total of the principal payments in the first two years 
of a conventional mortgage with a 6.5% interest rate. See Lisa Milot, 
Accounting for Time: A Relative-Interest Approach to the Division of 
Equity in Hybrid-Property Homes Upon Divorce, 100 Ky. L.J. 585, 607–
09 (2011–2012)  (providing a more in-depth example and explanation of 
the components of and variations to the formula). 
64. This amount consists of the $50,000 down payment and $5,000 principal 
payments. 
65. $55,000 (nmc) + $20,000 (scheduled marital principal payments) + 
$35,000 (lump-sum marital principal payment) = $110,000.  
66. The net equity equals the home’s value less the outstanding mortgage. 
The original $200,000 mortgage has been reduced by the $5,000 
principal payment prior to marriage, the $20,000 monthly payments 
during the marriage, and the $35,000 lump sum payment, so $140,000 is 
outstanding at the time the marriage dissolves. Thus,  
 e = $500,000 – $140,000  
= $360,000. 
67. Net equity (e) – nonmarital property = marital property, or  
  $360,000 – $180,000 = $180,000. 
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to each estate even though the separate contributions were made 
many years before the marital contributions. In effect, the formula 
simply operates as though each estate held an equal 50% interest in 
the home from the moment of marriage forward. A truly 
“proportionate” allocation of the appreciation would have to account 
for the greater investment timeframe of the separate interest. 
The formula also ignores the fact that changes in a home’s value 
are not smooth. While our hypothetical home, for example, doubled in 
value between its owners’ marriage and divorce, this growth did not 
occur in 72 equal monthly increments. Instead, in some months it was 
greater and in some months it was less—or may even have been a 
loss. A “fair” allocation of the appreciation would allocate the periodic 
gain (or loss) between the estates each time their relative interests in 
the property changed. 
The current formula is straightforward, intuitive, and easy to 
apply. Because it values the home only at marriage and divorce, it 
requires little record-keeping and only a few very simple calculations. 
Yet the cost of this simplicity is a substantial transfer of wealth 
between the separate and marital estates. This transfer, moreover, is 
invisible and unacknowledged. While courts and legislatures are free 
to knowingly choose this outcome, there is no indication they have 
done so in adopting this formula. From all appearances, courts have 
simply assumed that the existing formula produces an economically 
sound allocation of appreciation, and lawyers have uncritically applied 
it. Put simply, legal innumeracy has produced a formula that 
sacrifices fairness and accuracy for simplicity. And, notwithstanding 
the formula’s widespread use over more than thirty years, this fact 
has gone largely unrecognized.68 
C. Innumeracy Through Misunderstanding 
A final form of innumeracy involves a problem at the heart of 
innumeracy in the law: many lawyers misunderstand fundamental 
mathematical principles.69 In other words, mistakes in calculations 
 
68. This oversimplification is the central problem addressed in my most 
recent article. Milot, supra note 63, at 618–23; cf. William A. Reppy, 
Jr., Apportioning Business Profits Generated by Spousal Labor and 
Capital Owned Over Time by Shifting Fractional Shares of the Separate 
and Community/Marital Estates, 31 Fam. L.Q. 63 (1997) (making an 
analogous critique of the law concerning hybrid-property businesses). 
69. One manifestation of this misunderstanding is the misuse of numerical 
terms. For example, a recent student note states that the author is 
“saddled with massive debt,” but in the next sentence refers to the 
author’s three-digit net worth, seemingly without awareness that this 
formulation means that the author has assets with a value even greater 
than his “massive debt.” See Joshua Plager, Note, Trim, Plan, Law 
School: We Have a Situation (Now Let’s Fix It), 67 U. Miami L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2013). 
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reflect a deeper lack of comprehension about how numbers work. This 
problem is well documented in legal writings: both courts70 and 
commentators,71 for example, have often criticized lawyers for mis-
understanding statistical evidence. 
One troublesome example involves the use of faulty probabilistic 
evidence to establish a defendant’s guilt or innocence in a criminal case. 
In Collins, for example, the court was not only concerned with the 
power of math to bewitch the jury.72 It also criticized the prosecutor’s 
misapplication of statistical principles that led to the production of 
erroneous and ultimately meaningless probabilistic evidence. 
At trial, the defendant, Malcolm Collins, had been convicted of 
second-degree robbery based largely on probabilistic evidence. The 
prosecutor had proposed probabilities for the occurrence of each of six 
factors to establish an extremely high likelihood that Mr. Collins had 
assisted his wife Janet73 in stealing a purse.74 Based on these 
probabilities, the prosecutor argued that there was only 1 chance in 
12 million that the defendant could be innocent. 
In reviewing Mr. Collins’s case on appeal, the California Supreme 
Court sharply criticized the prosecutor’s misuse of statistics. Instead 
of being based on statistical (or, really, any) research, the probability 
factor for each of the characteristics was merely a guess.75 Moreover,  
70. See, e.g., Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1263–66 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(claiming that “people must be sure of what they are looking for, and 
how they can prove it, before they start fooling with algebra” before 
asserting that the defendant’s lawyers failed at the task of analyzing the 
probabilities and statistics); People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 38–42  (Cal. 
1968) (en banc) (finding that the prosecutor’s use of probability 
statistics was improper since the testimony lacked foundation in 
statistical theory and evidence). 
71. See, e.g., Aaron Taggart & Wayne Blackmon, Statistical Base and 
Background Rates: The Silent Issue Not Addressed in Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 7 Law, Probability & Risk 275, 276 (2008) (“The ability to use 
statistical base rates is necessary for a competent argument and ruling 
in a vast number of cases, yet the problem is seemingly addressed 
without cognizance of the frequency with which the challenge arises.”); 
Tribe, supra note 14, at 1334–38 (criticizing the use of statistical 
evidence in Collins).  
72. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s 
concern with the effect of statistical evidence on the jury). 
73. Mrs. Collins did not appeal her conviction. Collins, 438 P.2d at 33. As a 
result, this analysis focuses only on the use of probabilistic evidence with 
respect to Mr. Collins. 
74. The factors and probabilities asserted were: a partly yellow automobile 
(1∕10), a man with a mustache (¼), a girl with a ponytail (1∕10), a girl with 
blond hair (1∕3), an African-American man with a beard (1∕10), and an 
interracial couple in a car (1∕1000). Id. at 37 n.10. 
75. In fact, the prosecutor even invited the jurors to substitute their own 
guesses for his. Id. at 38.  
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the prosecutor’s treatment of the six factors as mutually 
independent—and thus properly multiplied together to find their 
collective probability76—was a “glaring defect” since it was clearly 
untrue. For example, the sets of girls with blond hair and of those 
with ponytails are obviously partly overlapping, as are the sets of 
African-American men with a beard and of men with a mustache.77 
To multiply the probabilities, as the prosecution had done, 
“inevitably yield[s] a wholly erroneous and exaggerated result even if 
all of the individual components had been determined with 
precision.”78 The court held that the prosecutor’s misapplication of 
fundamental statistical principles constituted a miscarriage of justice 
and overturned Mr. Collins’s conviction on that ground. 
Despite the scathing critiques of the misuse of probabilistic 
evidence in Collins, this form of innumeracy has proven tenacious. 
Twenty years later, Judge Frank Easterbrook confronted the flipside 
of the Collins issue: whether proffered statistical evidence was 
sufficient to establish that a defendant’s guilt was too improbable for 
conviction as a matter of law.79 And again, the court held that 
counsel had misused statistical principles, rendering the resulting 
probabilistic evidence untrustworthy. 
In the case before Judge Easterbrook, Branion v. Gramly, Dr. 
John Branion Jr. was appealing his conviction for the murder of his 
wife, Donna.80 He had been convicted based on circumstantial 
 
76. This is the “product rule” or “multiplication rule.” Id. at 39 (citing 
Note, Evidence: Admission of Mathematical Probability Statistics Held 
Erroneous for Want of Demonstration of Validity, 1967 Duke L.J. 665, 
669 n.25). 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1261–64 (7th Cir. 1988). Similarly, 
at O.J. Simpson’s trial for the murder of his ex-wife, law professor Alan 
Dershowitz testified that there was only a 0.04% chance that Mr. 
Simpson had killed his ex-wife. D. Kim Rossmo, Failures in Criminal 
Investigations, Police Chief, Oct. 2009, at 54, 62. But the statistics to 
which Professor Dershowitz testified were in fact only relevant as to the 
probability that Nicole Simpson would be killed by her ex-husband 
based solely on the evidence that he had battered her. Id. at 61–62. The 
more relevant statistic, which was not disclosed at trial, was that the 
likelihood that a battered woman’s abuser was her killer once she was, 
in fact, killed, was almost 90%. Id. at 62. In whole numbers, this 
represents the difference between a 9-in-22,500 chance and a 9-in-10 
chance. 
80. Branion, 855 F.2d at 1258–59. Mrs. Branion had been strangled and 
shot at least four times in her apartment. There was no evidence she 
had been molested, that the apartment had been forcibly entered, or 
that anything had been stolen. She was found by her husband who, 
despite being a physician, did not assist her. The murder weapon was a 
rare type of gun that Dr. Branion, a gun collector, owned. When asked 
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evidence and appealed to the Seventh Circuit, claiming that it was 
impossible for him to have killed her because the murder simply took 
more time than he had available.81 In support of this position, Dr. 
Branion’s lawyers asserted that the probability that he could have 
committed the murder was less than 0.0001% based on individual 
probabilities of less than 0.01% for each of two timing factors: the 
drive time between the hospital at which Dr. Branion worked that 
day and the apartment where the murder occurred and the length of 
time it takes for bruises like those on Mrs. Branion’s neck to form.82 
The court acknowledged the importance of statistical evidence as 
a general matter, but objected to the specific use by the defendant’s 
lawyers, finding that they had misunderstood how to produce a 
meaningful calculation of probabilities.83 Indeed, as in Collins, the 
probabilities asserted by the defendant’s lawyers were based on 
ungrounded or faulty assumptions with no actual data collection.84 
Moreover, the court expressed disbelief that the defendant’s lawyers 
“simply multiplied two small numbers to get a smaller one, without 
 
to produce it by the police, though, Dr. Branion gave them a different 
gun; his gun that matched the description of the murder weapon was 
never produced. Four shell casings matching the type located in the 
couple’s locked gun cabinet were found next to Mrs. Branion’s body. 
Shortly after Mrs. Branion’s murder, Dr. Branion married his mistress. 
In the words of the court, “The evidence was circumstantial, but what 
circumstances!” Id. at 1258. Indeed, the noteworthy circumstances were 
not limited to the facts of the murder: the judge at Dr. Branion’s trial 
might have tried to solicit bribes in return for overturning the jury’s 
verdict, the prosecutor engaged in ex parte communications with the 
judge, and, at the end of the trial, Dr. Branion fled to Africa, where he 
became Idi Amin’s personal physician for several years prior to being 
returned to the United States upon regime change and appealing his 
conviction. Id. at 1258–59. 
81. Id. at 1261–63. 
82. Id. at 1263. 
83. Id. at 1263–65. Cf. People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 33 (Cal. 1968) (en 
banc) (“While we discern no inherent incompatibility between the 
disciplines of law and mathematics and intend no general disapproval or 
disparagement of the latter as an auxiliary in the fact-finding processes 
of the former, we cannot uphold the technique employed in the instant 
case.”). 
84. Moreover, the court noted that, even without these misconceptions, the 
defense attorneys simply miscalculated the probability that the drive 
time could have been as needed for Dr. Branion to have committed the 
murder. Branion, 855 F.2d at 1265. Instead of being a probability of 
0.01% based on the assumption that it was three standard deviations 
from the mean, the court asserted that the probability was actually 
0.1%. Id. In fact, a few more than 99.7% of all outcomes will fall within 
three standard deviations in a normal curve; so the actual probability is 
just under 0.15%. 
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describing why these were plausible numbers or why we ought to 
multiply them.”85 Ultimately the court found the lawyers’ arguments 
unpersuasive because they lacked a sound statistical basis. 
At issue in both Collins and Branion was a fundamental 
misunderstanding by attorneys about the principles of mathematical 
probability. Instead of collecting and analyzing data through the use 
of statistical tools, the lawyers invented data and multiplied the 
resulting figures to produce probabilities favorable to their legal 
positions. As a result, the numbers standing in for evidence in each 
case were unmoored from meaning. For the lawyers, though, the very 
mystique of the numbers provided sufficient evidence to paint a 
picture about the defendant’s guilt or innocence. But such efforts do 
not involve a proper use of mathematics. As noted by the Branion 
court, the sound assessment of probabilities “can be a daunting 
task.”86 When lawyers fail to understand background mathematical 
principles, the task becomes impossible. 
Not all lawyers are bad at math. And not all instances of “bad 
math” involve innumeracy. Often, however, the difficulty lawyers 
have with selecting, presenting, calculating, analyzing, and critiquing 
numbers is a product of innumeracy and bears consequences for our 
ability to fully represent our clients. 
II. The Significance of Legal Innumeracy 
Despite our often profound discomfort with numbers, for many 
lawyers numerical analysis is a part of the everyday practice of law. 
Mathematical data illuminating legal issues are pervasive; in fact, 
“[m]uch of the evidence we think of as most reliable is just a 
compendium of statistical inferences.”87 Thus, proof of causation in 
toxic torts litigation often relies on statistically based epidemiological 
proof,88 and statistical evidence showing disparate hiring practices 
 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 1264. 
87. Id. 
88. United States v. Shonubi, 895 F. Supp. 460, 517 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing 
Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of 
Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 Yale L.J. 376, 377 (1986)), 
vacated, 103 F.3d 1085 (2d Cir. 1997); see also David L. Faigman et 
al., Science in the Law: Standards, Statistics and Research 
Issues § 7-1.1 (2002) (noting the importance of statistical evidence in 
mass tort litigation). Where such statistical evidence is absent, plaintiffs 
are often unsuccessful in obtaining relief, particularly in cases that do 
not involve a signature disease or in which the disease in question does 
not manifest itself immediately. Shonubi, 895 F. Supp. at 517 (citing 
Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on 
Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 14–18 (1993)). 
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based on an applicant’s race or sex is often critical to establishing 
employment discrimination.89 Antitrust litigation includes evidence 
based on regression analysis,90 and trial attorneys use the discounted 
value of lost future earnings to calculate damages in personal injury 
lawsuits.91 Indeed, the formula chosen to calculate individual investors’ 
gains and losses will determine the winners and losers of billions of 
dollars in cases such as that involving the misdeeds of Bernie Madoff.92  
In other contexts, mathematical analysis plays a supporting role. 
Judge Learned Hand famously expressed the standard of care that 
defines negligence in tort law algebraically,93 although at trial this 
analysis is at most a background defense to forestall juries from 
punishing defendants for the cold quantification of lives and pain the 
formula embodies.94 More recently, courts have extended this formula 
 
89. See, e.g., Christine E. Webber, A Plaintiff’s Perspective on Some 
Evidentiary Issues and Jury Instructions in Employment Discrimination 
Litigation, in Evidence Issues and Jury Instructions in 
Employment Cases 169, 173–74 (ALI-ABA Course of Study 2007) 
(stating that “[s]tatistical evidence showing a pattern of conduct by an 
employer is considered evidence of pretext in an individual case,” and 
explaining that “[c]ourts have often held that mere numerical evidence is 
insufficient to prove a prima facie case, and must be subjected to 
analysis including comparison to the available labor pool to be 
admitted”); see also Shonubi, 895 F. Supp. at 517) (noting the centrality 
of statistical evidence in employment discrimination cases). 
90. See Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the Courtroom, 85 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1048, 1048 n.4 (1985) (providing examples of cases that discuss the 
use of regression analysis and statistical techniques in antitrust 
litigation). 
91. See Tribe, supra note 14, at 1338 n.29 (listing cases focusing on 
calculations of the plaintiffs’ expected lifetime earnings). 
92. See Ken Belson & Alison Leigh Cowan, Mets Owners Hope Courts Will 
Limit Liability, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 2011, at B12 (describing the 
possible formulas for recovering and allocating invested funds). 
93. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) 
(“Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic 
terms: if the probability [of injury] be called P; the injury, L; and the 
burden [of preventing the injury], B; liability depends upon whether B is 
less than L multiplied by P: i. e., whether B < PL.”). 
94. See, e.g., Raeder, supra note 1, at 1590 (“Who among us would not find 
it a true challenge to defend a corporation, in a case involving serious 
personal injury or death, by telling the jury that a cost-benefit analysis 
of the missing safety device demonstrated its economic infeasibility?”); 
see also Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula 
Balancing, the Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 Vand. L. 
Rev. 813, 839 (2001) (noting that one limitation on the use of the 
Hand Formula is jurors’ “tendencies to be swayed by sympathy for the 
victim, by hindsight, and by the pull of strict liability intuitions”); 
Michael D. Green, Negligence = Economic Efficiency: Doubts >, 75 
Tex. L. Rev. 1605, 1640–42 (1997) (discussing the aftermath of 
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to help decide issues as disparate as whether governmental action was 
reckless, whether there was probable cause for a warrantless search, 
and whether there was sufficient evidence to allow a preliminary 
injunction.95 Probabilistic proof based on genetic markers is prevalent, 
but not alone determinative, in paternity litigation and many criminal 
prosecutions.96 
Outside of the courtroom, some legal practices are explicitly 
predicated on numerical analysis. Estate planning attorneys calculate 
intestate and elective shares.97 Environmental regulators rely on 
statistically based risk assessments in defining acceptable levels of 
pollutants,98 as do drug regulators evaluating permissible side effects 
of new medications.99 Family law attorneys calculate child support 
and assist in the division of property between divorcing spouses,100 
always with an eye to statutory formulas and the tax consequences of 
the arrangements they negotiate. Transactional attorneys draft 
 
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981), in 
which Ford was publicly castigated for a report, unused at trial, that 
showed that the cost of design changes to prevent 180 burn deaths was 
not economically sensible, and stating that because of such sensibilities, 
trial lawyers cannot practically, and do not, defend negligence suits by 
pointing to the economic rationality of not preventing the harm in 
question). 
95. Barbara Ann White, Risk-Utility Analysis and the Learned Hand 
Formula: A Hand that Helps or a Hand that Hides?, 32 Ariz. L. Rev. 
77, 79 (1990). But see Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth 
of the “Hand Formula”, 4 Theoretical Inquiries L. 1, 4 (2003) 
(stating that the Hand formula is “infrequently mentioned by the 
courts, almost never included in jury instructions, rarely actually 
employed in judicial opinions, and almost never explains the actual 
results reached by the courts”). 
96. See, e.g., Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1263–66 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(critiquing the use of probabilistic evidence in a criminal trial); William 
C. Thompson & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Turning a Blind Eye to Misleading 
Scientific Testimony: Failure of Procedural Safeguards in a Capital 
Case, 18 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 151, 155–69 (2008) (same). 
97. See supra notes 39–49 and accompanying text (discussing the 
calculation of the value of an interest in an FLP for estate planning 
purposes). 
98. See Faigman, supra note 88, § 8-1.1 (discussing the use of hazard 
identification, dose-response estimation, exposure assessment, and risk 
characterization for environmental hazards).  
99. See id. (“Toxicological evidence plays a central role in the regulation of 
drugs . . . .”). 
100. See, e.g., Wall St. J., supra note 54 (discussing New York’s formula 
for temporary spousal support); supra notes 54–68 and accompanying 
text (analyzing the dominant formula for dividing the equity in hybrid-
property homes on divorce). 
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antidilution formulas and calculate stock exchange ratios.101 The 
valuation of intellectual property is one of the higher-stakes and 
ofttimes more contentious issues in many mergers and acquisitions.102 
And the list could go on.103 
Moreover, the importance of numerical understanding in the law is 
growing. Oliver Wendell Holmes declared more than 100 years ago that 
“[f]or the rational study of law the black-letter man may be the man of 
the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the 
master of economics.”104 Time has proven Justice Holmes prescient. In 
the 1960s there were fewer than 600 federal district court opinions that 
included the terms “statistic,” “statistics,” or “statistical.”105 In striking 
contrast, by the 1990s there were nearly ten times as many such 
opinions,106 and this count more than tripled again in the last ten years, 
 
101. See Michael A. Woronoff, Teaching Numeracy, 12 Transactions: 
Tenn. J. Bus. L. (Special Report) 243, 253 (2011) (including a 
nonexhaustive list of fourteen tasks commonly performed by 
transactional lawyers that require numeracy). 
102. See Ted Hagelin, Valuation of Intellectual Property Assets: An 
Overview, 52 Syracuse L. Rev. 1133, 1133–40 (2002) (reviewing the 
three basic valuation methods, discussing the valuation methods 
developed for intellectual property, and presenting a new valuation 
method); see also Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property and 
International Mergers and Acquisitions, 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1283, 1309–
14 (1998) (explaining the net present value approach to intellectual 
property valuation). 
103. And it does. For additional examples, see Faigman, supra note 88, §§ 5-
1.1 to -1.3 (describing the use of statistical assessments in antitrust, 
voting rights, employment discrimination, psychological tests, and DNA 
fingerprinting); Meyerson & Meyerson, supra note 17, at 772 (“Statistics 
are regularly used to prove or disprove issues as diverse as causation of 
injuries in toxic torts cases, breach of contracts, discrimination in 
employment and voting, DNA identification in criminal and family law, 
trademark and patent violations, environmental harm, securities fraud, 
and loss of future earnings.”); Tribe, supra note 14, at 1338 (noting that 
use of mathematical techniques at trial is required where “the governing 
substantive law makes a controversy turn on such questions as 
percentage of market control, expected lifetime earnings, likelihood of 
widespread public confusion, or the randomness of a jury selection 
process” (footnotes omitted)).  
104. O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897). 
105. A Westlaw search shows 596 federal district court cases mentioning at 
least one of these terms from January 1, 1960 through December 31, 1969. 
106. A similar search returns 5,937 hits for January 1, 1990 through 
December 31, 1999. This approach was suggested by the court in United 
States v. Shonubi, 895 F. Supp. 460, 514 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), which found 
around half as many cases using a LEXIS search through July 31, 1995. 
Cf. Rubinfeld, supra note 90, at 1048 (discussing the increasing 
importance of econometrics in litigation). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 3·2013 
Illuminating Innumeracy 
792 
with almost 19,000 such opinions issued.107 While these numbers offer 
only a crude measure of the increasing importance of numerical analysis 
in litigation, they point to the significance to the legal profession of 
understanding and appropriately referencing numerical concepts, at 
least in federal cases. Indeed, the even more recent explosion of 
technological innovations, such as smart phones, tablet computers, and 
cloud computing further increases the significance of numerical 
confidence and competence in the law. Locating, understanding, and 
analyzing the associated metadata produced in electronic discovery 
requires experts—legal and otherwise—who are comfortable with 
information technology and statistical calculations to make sense of the 
resulting deluge of data. 
While the extent to which numerical understanding is important 
in the practice of law has increased in recent years, innumeracy in the 
law is not itself a new problem. Self-deprecating references and jokes 
about lawyers’ incompetence with math have been around for 
generations, as have well-documented manifestations of innumeracy: 
Collins was decided in 1968;108 Professor Tribe critiqued the use of 
probabilistic proof in criminal cases in 1971;109 Brandenburg was 
decided in 1981;110 and Branion is from almost a quarter century 
ago.111 Despite its acknowledged difficulties with numbers, the legal 
profession has flourished. Ultimately, does it matter if lawyers are bad 
at math? 
Many mathematical errors that lawyers make are corrected before 
they do harm. In Estate of Kelley, the court noted that the taxpayer’s 
counsel incorrectly discounted the value of the FLP’s assets in 
determining the tax due on the transfer of its interests but the court 
correctly combined the discounts it determined in its own 
calculations.112 The California Supreme Court reversed Mr. Collins’s 
 
107. A search of the period January 1, 2002 through December 31, 2011 
returns 18,988 cases. 
108. People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968) (en banc) (overturning the 
defendant’s conviction because of the misuse of probabilistic evidence); 
see also supra notes 18–20, 72–78 and accompanying text (discussing 
Collins). 
109. See Tribe, supra note 14, at 1358–77 (detailing the costs of using 
probabilistic proof in the fact-finding process of a legal trial). 
110. Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d 871, 872 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) 
(setting forth the current formula for the division of equity in hybrid-
property homes); see also supra notes 54–68 and accompanying text 
(discussing Brandenburg). 
111. Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1263–66 (7th Cir. 1988) (rejecting 
the defendant’s appeal that relied on faulty probabilistic evidence); see 
also supra notes 79–87 and accompanying text (discussing Branion). 
112. Estate of Kelley ex rel. Louden v. Comm’r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 369 
(2005); see supra note 52 (explaining the error in Kelley). 
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conviction despite his own counsel’s inability to show why the 
probabilistic evidence offered at trial was problematic.113 The Seventh 
Circuit deftly waded through the probabilistic evidence with which 
Dr. Branion’s counsel presented it, rejecting the argument that 
statistics compelled the jury to acquit.114 In each case, the math-
ematical errors of attorneys were discovered and corrected by more 
numerate courts. 
In other instances, the cost of the error is so low that innumeracy 
may prove to be an efficient outcome. For example, while the 
dominant formula for dividing the equity in hybrid-property homes 
upon divorce produces an invisible and systemic transfer of wealth 
between the separate and marital estates, in any given divorce the 
total sum in question may be relatively low—thousands of dollars, at 
most—and there are costs to a more accurate division: time invested, 
information required, and expert assistance procured.115 The total cost 
of preventing the errors by addressing the innumeracy of lawyers may 
be higher than the total cost of allowing them. 
Even so, efficiency concerns clearly do not explain or justify many 
instances of innumeracy in the law. A less numerate court than the 
Seventh Circuit might well have accepted Dr. Branion’s probabilistic 
proof and released him despite the jury verdict of guilty. Malcolm 
Collins’s conviction was overturned but that of his wife was not,116 even 
though both convictions were based on the same probabilistic evidence. 
Mathematical errors, moreover, can prove extremely costly. Many 
FLPs have net asset values in the tens—or even hundreds—of 
millions of dollars.117 Miscalculating the value of an interest by even a 
few percentage points can change a taxpayer’s liability by millions of 
dollars.118 While these sorts of errors would generally be resolved on 
audit if caught by the Internal Revenue Service, in cases where it 
 
113. Collins, 438 P.2d at 41–42; see supra notes 72–86 and accompanying 
text. 
114. Branion, 855 F.2d at 1263–66; see supra notes 79–86 and accompanying 
text. 
115. See supra notes 55–66 and accompanying text. 
116. Collins, 438 P.2d at 33.  
117. See, e.g., Estate of Schutt ex rel. Schutt v. Comm’r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1353, 1362 (2005) (valuing the FLPs in question at a combined total of 
$93,778,121); Estate of Bongard ex rel. Bernards v. Comm’r, 124 T.C. 
95, 132 (2005) (underlying value of FLP assets was $158,259,261); 
Estate of Strangi ex rel. Gulig v. Comm’r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331, 1335 
(2003) (“The total value of the property held by [the FLP] as of the 
date of death was $11,100,922 . . . .”). 
118. As of 2013, the maximum gift and estate tax rate is 40% and applies to 
assets over $5,250,000 that a taxpayer gratuitously transfers in a taxable 
transaction. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-
240, § 101, 126 Stat. 2313 (2013). 
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results in the overvaluation of a taxpayer’s interest in an FLP—and 
thus an overpayment of transfer tax—that is unlikely to occur.119 In 
addition, audit itself bears financial (and often psychological) costs for 
clients. Even when the ultimate tax burden is reduced, in some 
instances the client’s overall bill is increased due to additional 
accounting and attorneys’ fees, and for many clients the stress of an 
audit itself is a cost not to be assumed lightly.120 Finally, in many 
instances the transfer of FLP interests is designed to exactly equal the 
amount a taxpayer may transfer each year without being subject to 
gift tax.121 Where the value of an FLP interest that is the subject of 
such a gift is initially understated, the later correction on audit may 
cause the value of the gift to exceed this annual limit. Thus, the 
excess value is subject to gift tax despite the taxpayer’s effort to limit 
the size of the gift to one without tax consequence. 
There is a broader point, too. Innumeracy in the law matters even 
when specific miscalculations, oversimplifications, and misunderstandings 
are later corrected. Too often our discomfort with numbers means that 
we fail to challenge, or even recognize, the subjective assessments made 
in the compilation and presentation of numerical information. 
Additionally, numeracy involves more than the ability to perform 
mechanical calculations: it is a way of thinking with a distinct 
language. As a result, innumeracy limits more than just our ability to 
work with numbers; it limits our ability to think about legal issues 
involving numbers. Even where we do have doubts about the accuracy 
or objectiveness of numerical information, lawyers often lack the ability 
to effectively think through or express these doubts because of a 
discomfort and unfamiliarity with the language of numbers. Thus, we 
are less likely to self-correct our errors or identify underlying 
inconsistencies than if we had a greater degree of facility with numbers. 
Finally, and most intangibly, it may be that, especially in a world so 
focused on science and technology, innumeracy simply matters by 
concealing the inner workings of the law in a troubling way, 
 
119. In addition, it places the burden on the government to monitor and 
catch math errors by attorneys. At a time when funding for the IRS is 
subject to repeated cuts, limiting its ability to conduct audits, such 
miscalculations contribute to the difference between what taxpayers owe 
in taxes and what they pay each year. See The Tax Gap, Internal 
Revenue Serv. (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/uac/The-Tax-Gap 
(explaining “tax gap” calculations). 
120. Similarly, even Mr. Collins’s acquittal was far from costless to both him 
and the state, as it consumed substantial amounts of time, money, and 
emotional energy. 
121. Known as the “annual exclusion amount,” it is currently equal to 
$14,000. See I.R.C. § 2503(b) (2006); Rev. Proc. 2012-41, 2012-45 I.R.B. 
539, 541 (setting forth the inflation adjustment for 2013). For a 
discussion of annual gifting techniques for FLP interests, see generally 
Repetti, supra note 40. 
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undermining the legitimacy of the resulting legal rules and outcomes. 
Below, I examine each of these ways that innumeracy limits our 
understanding of legal issues. 
A. Overvaluing Numerical Information 
Lawyers who are not comfortable working with numbers oftentimes 
overvalue them. Instead of thinking critically about numbers, we mistake 
their preciseness and concreteness for accuracy and objectivity,122 and we 
leave unquestioned the underlying assumptions on which data collection 
is based and calculations are made. By overvaluing numerical 
information, lawyers treat calculations as a black box—to be accepted 
and looked at from the outside, but not opened for the inner workings to 
be understood and appropriately challenged. The result is that 
innumeracy separates numbers from their underlying meanings. 
A further aspect of Collins provides a classic example of this sort 
of overvaluation. While not the focus of its opinion, as a tertiary issue 
the court worried that Mr. Collins’s defense counsel was unable to 
effectively defend his client from the prosecutor’s “engaging but logically 
irrelevant expert demonstration” because of his lack of statistical 
training.123 Not only did mathematics bewitch the jury, but it also 
enchanted the lawyers.124 Without the skills needed to look behind the 
probabilities and statistical analysis put forward by the prosecutor, 
Mr. Collins’s lawyer was unable even to begin to rebut the 
prosecution’s case. As a result, Mr. Collins was convicted despite the 
lack of any data or statistical analysis underlying the probabilistic 
evidence presented. 
One consequence of this overvaluation is that lawyers fail to 
question or even recognize the existence of the subjective judgments 
that underlie numerical information. Michael Meyerson and William 
Meyerson have focused attention on the problem with respect to judges: 
Too many judges . . . fail to see that the meaning to be given to 
mathematical results is frequently not a matter of scientific 
necessity, but a reflection of specific value judgments. By 
ignoring those judgments that are inherent in the mathematical 
 
122. Historian Patricia Cline Cohen noted a similar concern outside the legal 
arena: “Well into the nineteenth century, the novelty of numbers, and 
especially their concreteness, conferred such reality on quantitative data 
that few people were moved to examine the process by which they had 
been generated. The specificity of numbers was mistaken for accuracy 
and exactitude.” Patricia Cline Cohen, A Calculating People: 
The Spread of Numeracy in Early America 211 (1982). 
123. People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 38 (Cal. 1968) (en banc). 
124. Presumably, even the prosecutor did not understand the failings of the 
probabilistic evidence he proffered or he would not have introduced it 
into evidence. 
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choices, judges have acquiesced to values that are at odds with 
our system of justice.125 
For the Meyersons, this blind acquiescence results in mathematical 
rather than judicial policy making126: he who controls the numbers, 
controls the policies. In similar fashion, when lawyers overvalue math, 
they fail to see the subjective perspectives informing the compilation, 
calculation, and presentation of numerical information. Instead, they 
rely on opposing counsel or experts to explain reality through a lens 
of their own self-interested making. 
The phenomenon of overvaluation may help explain the wide 
acceptance of the now-dominant formula for valuing the respective 
interests in a hybrid-property home on divorce.127 On its face, the 
formula seems to make sense: simply compute the dollar value of the 
respective contributions to the home’s value and divide any 
appreciation based on the resulting ratio. Yet on closer analysis it is 
clear that it in fact does not make economic sense. It may be that the 
very mathematical formulation of the approach—nmc/tc × e = 
nonmarital property128—has created a visceral impression of its 
sophistication (and thus its correctness) and dissuaded serious 
analysis. 
Numbers and statistics do not speak for themselves; they require 
interpretation to have meaning.129 When lawyers are taken in by a 
facade of objectivity, they overvalue the numerical interpretations of 
others. We need mathematical competence and confidence to 
understand the difference between math that looks good and math 
that is good to effectively represent our clients. 
B. Failing to Speak the Language of Numbers 
Numeracy also matters to our ability to even think about 
numerical information. Because mathematics has its own language 
and is a distinct system of thought,130 lawyers must be comfortable 
with its vocabulary and syntax in order to be able to formulate and 
express criticisms of numerical data. Numerical fluency allows for 
argument and analysis rather than rhetoric and suppositions.131 
 
125. Meyerson & Meyerson, supra note 17, at 776; see also supra note 54 
(listing the Meyersons’ areas of research). 
126. See Meyerson & Meyerson, supra note 17, at 845.  
127. See supra notes 55–66 and accompanying text. 
128. See supra notes 55–66 and accompanying text (explaining the formula). 
129. Paulos, supra note 32, at xiv. 
130. Cf. id. at xiii (“[M]athematics [is] a way of thinking and a set of 
intricately connected higher-level skills . . . .”). 
131. In reference to the current debates over Medicare, Professor David 
Hyman has stated only somewhat facetiously that “our efforts at 
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Without understanding the language of math, lawyers will find 
themselves confused and ineffective in the face of numerical data. For 
example, while Mr. Collins’s defense counsel objected to the 
probabilistic evidence the prosecution presented,132 he lacked the 
ability to articulate why the testimony was problematic. As a result, 
his objections were overruled and Mr. Collins was convicted based on 
faulty inferences posing as numerical facts. 
Even with time for reflection, Mr. Collins’s counsel did little 
better on appeal.133 Although he rightly pointed to the high likelihood 
of interdependence among the factors provided by the prosecutor,134 
his “speculation about the nature of that interdependence was too 
goofy” to include in the court’s opinion135: while he attempted to peer 
into the shadows to see what stood behind the government’s numbers, 
he was unable to do so without the language of math.136 Instead, the 
court provided its own articulation of the prosecution’s failings in the 
absence of coherent guidance from the defense in overturning the 
conviction.137 The point is that a key limitation imposed by 
innumeracy is a linguistic one: without a solid grounding in 
mathematics, lawyers are unable to articulate criticisms of numerical 
information, even when they perceive that it has weaknesses. 
C. Legitimacy, Meaning, and the Practice of Law 
Both the overvaluation of numerical information and the failure 
to speak the language of numbers hamper the efforts of lawyers to 
represent their clients well. While some errors based in innumeracy 
 
destroying public education in the United States . . . ha[ve] rendered a 
large chunk of the population functionally innumerate. The impassioned 
defenses of Medicare offered by most health policy analysts will 
accordingly be resolved at the level of rhetoric, instead of through 
simple addition and subtraction.” David A. Hyman, Medicare Meets 
Mephistopheles, 60 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1165, 1200 (2003) (footnotes 
omitted). 
132. See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text. 
133. Mr. Collins had different counsel on appeal than at trial. Fisher, supra 
note 19, at 72–73. Neither lawyer, though, was able to effectively 
identify and explain the mathematical shortfalls in the prosecution’s 
case. Id.  
134. See supra text accompanying note 78.  
135. Fisher, supra note 19, at 73. 
136. Similarly, commentators have asserted that the inconsistent language 
concerning statistical concepts such as background rates and 
confounding variables used by courts in deciding environmental disputes 
has contributed to a lack of unity in the law.  Taggart & Blackmon, 
supra note 71, at 299. 
137. See Fisher, supra note 19, at 72–73 (noting that the court relied 
heavily on the work of a law clerk with a mathematics background).   
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are corrected, are efficient, or prove of little significance, others pose 
grave threats to a client’s economic well-being, freedom, or life. And 
numeracy matters for other, less-tangible reasons as well. 
The practice of law—from e-mail communication to word 
processing to e-discovery—rests on a base of numbers, math, and 
science. Many practice areas, such as those that involve patent 
prosecution, drafting licensing agreements, performing due diligence 
for high-tech start-up companies, and litigating temporary restraining 
orders against competitors infringing on intellectual property rights, 
are rooted in technology. That innumeracy is accepted, and even 
celebrated, in the legal profession means that many lawyers cannot 
contribute their voices and critical thinking abilities to some of the 
many interesting and novel legal questions their clients routinely face. 
As a result, the practice of law is less client-oriented, and less vibrant, 
than it could be. 
In addition, progress in some fields is hampered as lawyers and 
lawmakers repeatedly engage in low-level thinking, never getting to 
higher levels of analysis when decisive questions are numerically 
based. Wayne Blackmon and Aaron Taggart argue that the law’s 
discomfort with mathematical terms means that the evidentiary wheel 
is repeatedly reinvented with respect to statistical base rates in 
environmental policy disputes, with each case being decided on its 
own facts.138 Disappointed in the lack of coherence in the case law, 
they opine that “[m]any great legal questions involving math and 
science get superficial or inappropriate treatment” because of lawyers’ 
lack of mathematical confidence.139 
Ultimately, to the extent innumeracy prevails in the law, legal 
decisions are less than fully comprehensible and transparent. Even 
laypersons who are not highly numerate may feel put off when legal 
formulas and results are not numerically sound. Like commentators 
troubled by the Brandenburg formula or Mr. Collins’s counsel 
recognizing that the probabilities entered into evidence were flawed but 
in each case being unable to articulate why, some individuals intuitively 
recognize the existence of numerical sleights of hand with the result 
that innumeracy undermines the legitimacy of our legal system. 
Without an understanding of what numbers do and do not mean, 
numerical information is at best meaningless, and at worst harmful: 
tax liabilities are miscalculated,140 wealth is shifted unintentionally 
and invisibly between parties,141 costly disputes are prolonged,142 and 
 
138. Taggart & Blackmon, supra note 71, at 276.  
139. Id. at 275. 
140. See supra notes 39–53 and accompanying text. 
141. See supra notes 54–68 and accompanying text. 
142. See supra note 138. 
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defendants are erroneously convicted,143 all with the result that the 
legitimacy of our legal system is lessened. As one court has noted, 
“people must be sure of what they are looking for, and how they can 
prove it, before they start fooling with algebra.”144 Even when done 
well, the selection, presentation, and calculation of numbers conveys 
and obscures meanings and values.145 Lawyers must have the 
numerical competence and confidence to understand and challenge the 
assumptions and perspectives hiding in the shadows behind such 
mathematical data. 
III. Defining the Problem: Competence or Confidence? 
Given the pervasiveness and significance of numbers to the 
practice of law, why are so many lawyers innumerate? Is it a lack of 
competence, produced either by cognitive disability or by a persistent 
failure to engage with numbers and calculations so that they never 
learn the skills necessary for numeracy? Or is it, instead, a lack of 
confidence—a reflection of the fact that many lawyers excelled at 
reading and writing, and so, by comparison, grew to believe they were 
bad at math? While the fact of innumeracy in lawyers is well 
accepted, the reasons remain unexplored. Understanding the basis of 
innumeracy is the first step to overcoming it. 
A. Objective Innumeracy 
Objective innumeracy is characterized by a lack of numerical 
competence.146 It may be evidence of an underlying cognitive 
disability or the result of a lack of numeric education. Regardless of 
which of these shortcomings causes the issue, an individual who is 
objectively innumerate does not possess the tools necessary for 
thinking about and calculating numbers. 
1. Deficits in Cognitive Functioning 
One biological cause of objective innumeracy is developmental 
dyscalculia.147 The mathematical equivalent of dyslexia, 
 
143. See supra notes 72–86 and accompanying text. 
144. Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1264 (7th Cir. 1988). 
145. Cf. Meyerson & Meyerson, supra note 17 (criticizing the racism and 
sexism embodied in statistical tables and commonly reflected in damages 
awards). 
146. See Wendy Nelson et al., Clinical Implications of Numeracy: Theory 
and Practice, 35 Annals Behav. Med. 261, 264 (2008) (distinguishing 
between objective and subjective innumeracy). 
147. Dyscalculia can also be caused by traumatic brain injury, but that 
form is not the focus of this discussion. See David C. Geary, 
Mathematical Disabilities: Cognitive, Neuropsychological, and Genetic 
Components, 114 Psychol. Bull. 345, 345 (1993) (distinguishing 
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developmental dyscalculia is marked by structural abnormalities in 
the part of the brain that performs mathematical calculations and is 
thought to be heritable.148 It exists in 5–7% of the population and is, 
at times, paired with other developmental disorders such as dyslexia 
and attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder.149 It is not, though, 
associated with low intelligence or low academic achievement 
generally.150 
For individuals with dyscalculia, numbers lack meaning. The size 
and relative value of numbers are not readily apparent, making it 
difficult for a dyscalculic individual to manipulate numbers or think 
about the relationship between them.151 Common indicators of 
dyscalculia include the need to count (sometimes on fingers) to 
compare or add numbers, as well as difficulty in making numerical 
estimates.152 For example, a dyscalculic individual might estimate the 
height of a normal room as two hundred feet, or, to determine which 
of two playing cards is greater, he might count all of the symbols on 
each card.153 
Relatively little research has been done on the causes and 
consequences of developmental dyscalculia,154 an omission that is par-
 
acquired and developmental dyscalculia). Other biological bases for 
objective innumeracy may be attention-deficit disorders and anxiety 
disorders. In either case, it is not clear whether the often-associated 
difficulties with math are a product of the disorder or a second cognitive 
deficit. See Anna J. Wilson, Dyscalculia Primer and Resource Guide, 
Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., http://www.oecd.org/edu/ 
ceri/dyscalculiaprimerandresourceguide.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2013). 
148. See generally Brian Butterworth et al., Dyscalculia: From Brain to 
Education, 332 Science 1049 (2011) (describing the neurology and 
effects of dyscalculia and proposing research into interventions for it). 
149. Id. at 1049. But see Wilson, supra note 147 (citing research showing a 
prevalence of 3–6%). 
150. See Butterworth et al., supra note 148, at 1049 (“The disability can be 
highly selective, affecting learners with normal intelligence and normal 
working memory . . . .”); see also Nelson et al., supra note 146, at 261 
(“Low numeracy cannot be reliably inferred on the basis of patients’ 
education, intelligence, or other observable characteristics.”); Wilson, 
supra note 147 (noting that all definitions of dyscalculia recognize some 
degree of specificity to the disability rather than being associated with 
universal academic difficulties). 
151. Butterworth et al., supra note 148, at 1050. 
152. Id. at 1049. 
153. Id. 
154. See id. (observing that between 2000 and 2011 the National Institutes of 
Health spent $107.2 million on dyslexia research and only $2.3 million 
on dyscalculia research); Geary, supra note 147, at 358 (noting that 
“relatively little is known about mathematical learning disorders”); 
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ticularly striking in light of the attention that scientists, educators, and 
policy makers have given to dyslexia and other reading disabilities. 
Moreover, due to this lack of research, little is known about the popula-
tions in which it is most prevalent.155 One important area for future 
research is the prevalence of developmental dyscalculia among lawyers. 
Because of the widespread perception that lawyers are not—and 
need not be—good at math, it seems likely that dyscalculic individuals 
are overrepresented in the law when compared to professionals in fields 
explicitly requiring numerical analysis, like medicine, business, account-
ing, science, engineering, and graduate-level social sciences. High-
achieving dyscalculic individuals, especially those for whom the 
disability is not paired with dyslexia or another reading disability, 
might seek out legal careers to capitalize on their strengths in the belief 
that their lack of numeracy will not impair them professionally. If in 
fact dyscalculic individuals are overrepresented, or even just normally 
represented, among lawyers, specific interventions, such as identifying 
legal fields in which numerical competence is of reduced importance and 
consciously pairing highly numerate and dyscalculic individuals on law 
school assignments and in practice, might well be implemented. 
2. Deficits in Mathematics Education  
Not all cases of innumeracy reflect a cognitive disability. Instead, 
some individuals simply do not have the education needed for 
mathematical competence. It is not that they cannot do math, but 
rather that they have not learned to do it. Underlying this form of 
innumeracy may be deficient math instruction156 or a simple lack of 
personal motivation with respect to learning the subject.157 
Most law students do not come to law school with strong math 
backgrounds. In fact, fewer than 10% of law school students have 
more than an insignificant amount of undergraduate training in math, 
science, or engineering.158 Prior training in statistics is also unusual.159 
 
Wilson, supra note 147 (describing dyscalculia research as “just in its 
infancy”). 
155. See Butterworth et al., supra note 148, at 1053 (noting that dyscalculia 
is not widely recognized by educators and that recognition is vital for 
subsequent improvement). 
156. Researchers have suggested that one issue may be the emphasis on the 
mechanics of math in school without a corresponding emphasis on 
understanding how to apply those mechanics. See Stanislas Dehaene, 
The Number Sense: How the Mind Creates Mathematics 141 
(1997). 
157. Cf. Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 Iowa L. 
Rev. 197, 202 (2008) (“People are financially illiterate not because they 
are stupid, but because they have better things to do with their time.”). 
158. See Mark Graham & Bryan Adamson, Law Students’ Undergraduate 
Major: Implications for Law School Academic Support Programs 
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In writing about the relationship between science and legal decision 
making, David Faigman noted that “law students, as a group, seem 
particularly averse to math and science. . . . Students who display a 
talent in math and science typically pursue careers in medicine, 
engineering, biology, chemistry, computer science, and similar subjects. 
Students with less inclination toward quantitative analysis very often 
go to law school.”160 In short, many law students lack a solid math 
background. 
Once in law school, this deficit is not corrected. Most law schools 
include few, if any, explicitly numerically focused classes in their 
curricula.161 When offered, these classes are often considered necessary 
only for the practice of corporate law or tax law; few students not 
already planning to enter one of these fields opt into these courses.162 
This is a unique feature of legal education. Unlike other graduate-level 
programs such as those in the natural and social sciences, successful 
completion of law school generally does not require even a basic level 
of competence in statistics, quantitative methods, or mathematics.163 
By contrast, medical school students are expected to learn the basics 
 
(ASPs), 69 UMKC L. Rev. 533, 549 (2001) (finding that only 9 out of 
102 law students had this background); Peter Lee, Patent Law and the 
Two Cultures, 120 Yale L.J. 2 (2010) (less than 10% of law students 
have degrees in these areas); see also Daniel Keating, Ten Myths About 
Law School Grading, 76 Wash. U. L.Q. 171, 171 (1998) (postulating 
that law students’ misunderstanding of law school grading is based in 
part on the fact that “most law students had non-mathematical majors 
in college”); Woronoff, supra note 101, at 252 (“Often [law students] 
majored in undergraduate subjects in which they never had to use 
sophisticated mathematical concepts.”). 
159. See Steven B. Dow, There’s Madness in the Method: A Commentary on 
Law, Statistics, and the Nature of Legal Education, 57 Okla. L. Rev. 
579, 595 (2004) (noting that an earlier prediction that lawyers would 
become skilled in statistics was “largely wrong”). 
160. Faigman, supra note 88, at v. 
161. For example, of 24 law schools surveyed, almost half offered no 
numerically focused classes and one-third offered only one such class. Of 
course, a law student may be permitted to take classes in other 
departments, and classes not obviously numerically focused may include 
significant numerical analysis or calculation (and even those seemingly 
more mathematical might avoid calculations), but the point is that most 
law schools prioritize neither math teaching nor numerical analysis in 
their curricula. See infra Appendix (listing the schools surveyed and the 
numerically focused classes offered). 
162. See, e.g., Woronoff, supra note 101, at 252 (“[M]any people who go to 
law school do not want to learn material that requires understanding 
complex mathematical concepts. I’m not saying everyone, but I do think 
a large portion of law students have no desire to take courses that 
require proficiency with numerical ideas.” (footnote omitted)). 
163. Dow, supra note 159, at 579. 
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of statistics, read research articles replete with statistical analysis, and 
relate that research to medical problems they encounter.164 One study 
that examined the effect of graduate training on students’ reasoning 
ability found that, while medical and psychology programs improved 
students’ statistical-methodological reasoning abilities to a significant 
degree, law programs failed to do so.165 
Law professors often share the numerical discomfort of their 
students.166 Even when numbers and calculations are not edited out of 
the cases in casebooks, in many instances law professors gloss over 
them, instead giving preference to discussions of theories, arguments, 
holdings, and procedure. The implicit message to students is that 
math has little, if any, bearing on the practice of law. The content 
and context of legal education are such that any numerical skills that 
students may possess upon entering law school may well be dulled 
through three years of disuse. 
While tests for cognitive disabilities that result in innumeracy 
exist,167 this subject remains relatively unexplored as a general matter. 
And, as for lawyers, the problem of objective innumeracy is completely 
unexamined. Whether a product of an underlying biological condition 
like dyscalculia or a lack of mathematics education, objective 
innumeracy limits a lawyer’s effectiveness in representing clients. At the 
least, it requires some lawyers to rely entirely on more numerate 
individuals whose interests may not be aligned with a client’s interests 
for the calculations and assessments needed for the practice of law. 
 
164. See Darrin R. Lehman et al., The Effects of Graduate Training on 
Reasoning: Formal Discipline and Thinking About Everyday-Life 
Events, 43 Am. Psychologist 431, 440 (1988) (examining the medical 
curriculum at the University of Michigan). Even here, though, some 
commentators have criticized doctors’ ability to understand and 
communicate medical risk based on probabilistic data. See, e.g., Kuklin, 
supra note 15, at 527. 
165. Lehman et al., supra note 164, at 440. Statistical reasoning is the ability 
to reason using statistical ideas, often involving ideas about data, 
chance, and risk, while methodological reasoning involves understanding 
causal relationships and the role of confounding variables in the 
scientific process. Id. at 434. Law programs are not alone in this 
shortcoming, though. Graduate chemistry students similarly showed no 
improvement in these types of reasoning. Id. 
166. See, e.g., Keating, supra note 158, at 171 (opining that law professors 
lack both math skills and an interest in math); Meyerson & Meyerson, 
supra note 17, at 772 (same). 
167. See generally Lipkus et al., supra note 4 (developing a test to assess 
basic arithmetic and statistical skills); Lisa M. Schwartz et al., The Role 
of Numeracy in Understanding the Benefit of Screening Mammography, 
127 Annals Internal Med. 966 (1997) (setting forth a simple three-
question test of objective numeracy). 
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B. Subjective Innumeracy 
As with objective innumeracy, subjective innumeracy—that is, a 
lack of confidence in working with numbers—is not limited to 
individuals with low intelligence. Instead, it occurs with equal 
frequency across the intelligence spectrum and is present even among 
highly educated individuals.168 This lack of confidence may have an 
underlying biological cause such as math anxiety, which causes an 
objectively numerate individual to experience tension or fear when 
faced with mathematical tasks.169 In other individuals, subjective 
innumeracy may result from feelings of inadequacy with respect to 
math in relation to other cognitive tasks. In other words, an 
individual with a high degree of competence in reading and writing 
might simply feel inadequate in his mathematical ability by 
comparison, even though in an objective sense the person possesses 
good math skills. The important point is that each cause of subjective 
innumeracy in lawyers—whether math anxiety or relative 
incompetence—requires much closer attention than it has received in 
the past. In the remainder of this Part III, I offer some preliminary 
thoughts on these long-overlooked difficulties that many lawyers face. 
1. Math Anxiety  
Math anxiety is a biological condition in which feelings of 
discomfort, nervousness, or fear interfere with an individual’s ability 
to perform tasks requiring mathematical ability.170 Someone with 
math anxiety may avoid learning or practicing numerical analyses in 
order to avoid the associated feelings of panic, leading to objective 
innumeracy.171 Alternatively, math anxiety may cause otherwise 
math-competent individuals to lose confidence in their math ability, 
associating the biological markers of anxiety with a lack of actual 
ability when confronted with problems as basic as 46 + 18 = ? and 
34 – 19 = ?.172 Not surprisingly, mental arithmetic causes substantially 
more anxiety than that done on paper.173 Working with mixed-fraction 
 
168. Lipkus et al., supra note 4, at 37. 
169. See Wilson, supra note 147 (“ ‘Math anxiety’ is the name given to the 
feeling of tension and fear that some children and adults experience, and 
which is often specifically associated with mathematical activity.” 
(citation omitted)). 
170. Mark H. Ashcraft, Math Anxiety: Personal, Educational, and Cognitive 
Consequences, 11 Current Directions Psychol. Sci. 181, 181 
(2002). 
171. See id. (summarizing research showing that highly math anxious 
individuals “take fewer elective math courses, both in high school and in 
college, than people with low math anxiety”). 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 182. 
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problems,174 percentages, basic algebra, and factoring, as compared 
with doing arithmetic involving whole numbers, also heightens 
unease.175 Of particular concern to lawyers, individuals with a high 
degree of math anxiety often speed through the most difficult tasks in 
order to minimize the time they spend on anxiety-provoking work, 
with a correspondingly high increase in errors.176 
Achievement tests bear out the fact that math anxiety can exist 
alongside math competence.177 One study involved participants 
identified as having math anxiety who were tested for math 
competence before and after receiving treatment for the condition.178 
Even though they were not taught any additional math skills and did 
not practice math as part of the treatment, after treatment they 
showed significant improvement in math achievement scores.179 This 
improvement suggests that the scores achieved prior to treatment 
reflected a lower level of competence than the participants actually 
had.180 In the real world, math-anxious individuals begin to develop 
negative perceptions of their mathematical ability.181 Over time, a 
self-perpetuating cycle takes hold as students who believe they are 
bad at math avoid taking math classes to avoid the associated 
anxiety.182 
Math anxiety is correlated with high anxiety generally, although 
math anxiety is believed to be a form of anxiety that is distinct from 
general anxiety or test anxiety.183 Moreover, women self-report math 
anxiety at a higher rate than do men.184 Certain teaching methods are 
 
174. For example, 10 1⁄4 – 7 2⁄3  = ?. Id. at 182. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 183. 
177. See id. at 181 (noting that timed, online tests revealed math anxiety 
effects, while achievement tests revealed no competence differences). 
178. Id. at 182–83 (citing Ray Hembree, The Nature, Effects, and Relief of 
Mathematics Anxiety, 21 J. for Res. Mathematics Educ. 33 (1990)). 
179. Id. at 183. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 181–82. 
182. Id. at 182. 
183. Id. (noting that those with high math anxiety also have high anxiety in 
other areas, but that math anxiety is nonetheless a “separate 
phenomenon”).  
184. See id. (hypothesizing that this might reflect a greater willingness by 
women to admit to such anxiety instead of an actual greater 
occurrence). 
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correlated with math anxiety in students.185 For example, students 
with teachers who demand correctness without providing 
corresponding support may develop math anxiety based on feelings of 
vulnerability.186 
As with students with dyscalculia, students with math anxiety 
may well choose law disproportionately over other professions because 
of the perception that math ability is not important to the practice of 
law. For these students, law school becomes a sophisticated math-
avoidance mechanism that deflects attention from an underlying—and 
professionally significant—personal and practical problem. This 
danger merits attention, in part because math anxiety in the law 
student population responds well to treatment and relief alone can 
improve a student’s math performance. In addition, it is an area in 
which there is strong evidence that approaches to teaching can 
exacerbate or relieve underlying anxiety.  
To minimize math anxiety, professors including math in their 
courses should ensure that students know from the outset that they will 
be expected to discuss numerical information in class187 so that they can 
prepare appropriately ahead of time.188 Class discussions of numerical 
aspects of cases should be situated to help all students, including efforts 
to prevent the more anxious students from minimizing the time they 
spend on math189 or focusing on their anxiety rather than on what they 
can do.190 At the least, law professors should be cognizant of the forms 
 
185. Id. at 184 (citing Julianne C. Turner et al., The Classroom Environment 
and Students’ Reports of Avoidance Strategies in Mathematics: A 
Multimethod Study, 94 J. Educ. Psychol. 88 (2002)). 
186. Id. (citing Turner, supra note 185, at 101).  
187. Professor Woronoff reports that the course description for his Venture 
Capital class explicitly states: “Math competence through algebra is 
assumed and important.” Woronoff, supra note 101, at 253. Similarly, 
on the syllabus for my Trusts & Estates class, I recommend that the 
students bring a calculator to the final, alerting them to the fact that 
math is a component of the course from the start. 
188. See Ashcraft, supra note 170, at 182 (identifying time-pressured mental 
math as more anxiety provoking than when math is performed in 
writing). 
189. See supra text accompanying note 176, discussing this issue. 
190. See Ashcraft, supra note 170, at 183–84 (discussing the tendency of 
individuals with high math anxiety to focus on disrupting thoughts such 
as “one’s dislike or fear of math, one’s low self-confidence, and the like” 
rather than the task presented, so that “paying attention to these 
intrusive thoughts acts like a secondary task, distracting attention from 
the math task”). 
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of teaching that may lead to math anxiety in order to avoid needlessly 
increasing anxiety in law students.191 
2. Relative Competence 
Subjective innumeracy often surfaces even in the absence of 
biological factors such as anxiety. One explanation for this type of 
innumeracy may be a lack of relative competence. The problem arises 
because individuals who do less well in math than in other academic 
areas learn to self-identify as bad at math relative to their other 
strengths. In other words, students who perform at a high level on 
tasks requiring reading and writing, but only moderately well on 
quantitative tasks, may undervalue their math competence and thus 
develop a self-perception of innumeracy that does not correlate with 
objective reality. 
Tests of subjective numeracy with respect to statistics illustrate the 
important difference between objective and subjective innumeracy.192 In 
particular, the STAT-Confidence Scale tests subjects’ confidence in 
their ability to understand medical statistics by asking individuals to 
self-assess their competence.193 Actual results on this test only weakly 
correlate with objective measures of math skills, thus showing a high 
degree of independence of objective and subjective innumeracy.194 Put 
simply, the test shows that an individual who has the objective 
capacity to work competently with numbers may lack confidence in his 
ability to do so—and act accordingly. 
Professor David Hyman has suggested that one explanation for 
lawyers’ inability to do basic arithmetic is that they had higher scores 
on the verbal part of the Scholastic Aptitude Test than on the math 
part.195 To the extent this is true, this greater facility with verbal and  
191. For example, researchers have identified professors who demand 
correctness without providing explanations for mistakes and 
misunderstandings as one cause of math avoidance in students. Id. at 
184 (citing Turner, supra note 185, at 101). 
192. But see Nelson, supra note 146, at 265 (summarizing research that tests 
subjective innumeracy using questions that measure participants’ 
perception of their numerical ability and preferences for whether 
information should be presented using numbers or verbal descriptions, 
and finding a significant correlation between subjective and objective 
numeracy (citing Angela Fagerlin et al., Measuring Numeracy Without a 
Math Test: Development of the Subjective Numeracy Scale, 27 Med. 
Decision Making 672, 672–80 (2007))). 
193. Id. (citing Steven Woloshin et al., Patients and Medical Statistics: 
Interest, Confidence, and Ability, 20 J. Gen. Internal Med. 996 
(2005)). 
194. Id. at 266 (explaining that “the STAT-Confidence scale showed only a 
weak correlation (r = 0.15; p = 0.04) with an objective measure of 
numeracy, the Medical Data Interpretation Test”).  
195. Hyman, supra note 131, at 1168 n.12. 
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written tasks may very well contribute to subjective innumeracy 
among lawyers. Lawyers, after all, are accustomed to overachieving on 
verbal tasks throughout their lives. Thus, they may have developed 
early self-identities as being bad at math in comparison to their 
verbal achievements. This self-identification then becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy, as they seek out tasks that reinforce their (verbal) 
strengths and avoid those that play to their (numerical) weaknesses. 
To the extent a crisis of confidence underlies law students’ 
innumeracy, law schools cannot rely on students to choose the classes 
they most need. Instead, professors interested in improving their 
students’ numeracy should include confidence-building math exercises—
for example, simply working through the calculation of damages in a 
case and the allocation of the proceeds—in classroom discussions. 
Numerical information should be presented in multiple ways to reach 
as many students as possible and to help them become competent 
with thinking about numbers from multiple perspectives.196 Numerical 
tasks that build progressively197 and appropriately on each other over 
the course of the semester may assist students in developing 
numerical competence through familiarity, repetition, and the 
application of quantitative reasoning skills to actual legal situations. 
We should expect and reward tenacity in identifying and solving 
mathematical problems to encourage students to persevere in 
understanding numerical information. 
Innumeracy is a real, although not insurmountable, problem for 
many lawyers. It is also largely unexamined in the legal and scientific 
literature. Whether the product of objective or subjective factors, 
innumeracy contributes to a perception that lawyers in general are 
bad at math. Because of the importance of sound math skills to the 
practice of law, empirical research into innumeracy is needed.198 This 
research should consider whether, and the extent to which, each form 
of innumeracy is present in law students and lawyers, with a goal of 
providing useful guidance to law professors in helping students 
overcome the problem before beginning to practice law.  
 
196. Cf. Lipkus et al., supra note 4, at 42 (stating that “verbal translations 
that accompany numeric risks may help people better comprehend risk 
messages,” and suggesting that visual displays may assist in the effective 
communication of numerical data). 
197. To this end, Professor Michael Woronoff asserts that he teaches 
fundamental venture capital mathematical concepts incrementally by 
starting with very simple examples, then building in complexity by 
adding elements to the analysis throughout the course of the semester. 
Woronoff, supra note 101, at 253. 
198. Arden Rowell, of the University of Illinois College of Law, has recently 
begun such research. See Rowell & Bregant, supra note 11. 
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Conclusion: Moving Past Innumeracy 
Innumeracy matters. Just as reading, writing, and forming coherent 
legal arguments are skills we expect all lawyers to have, numeracy is 
critical to the practice of law. We must make a conscious effort to 
identify what underlies innumeracy in the law—an objective lack of 
mathematical ability or a subjective lack of confidence, or both—so that 
we can better understand its prevalence, causes, and solutions. 
On a systemic level, law schools need to provide the necessary 
resources to transmit numerical skills to their students. Medical schools 
could serve as a model for this, with their focus on teaching and 
applying basic mathematical analysis to medical problems. To the 
extent empirical studies show that dyscalculia is a particular disability 
of law students, moreover, law schools should design appropriate 
accommodations for coursework, testing, and career counseling.  
In the classroom, professors interested in enhancing the numeracy 
of their students should focus attention on the numerical components 
of cases no less than they do those cases’ nonnumerical aspects. At 
least some professors should integrate readings or numerical analysis 
into casebooks, or supplement existing casebooks with case excerpts 
including numerical information.  
Law students, too, have a role to play in improving their own 
numeracy. They should take responsibility for ensuring they have the 
skills they need before they leave law school. To the extent this is an 
area of concern for students, they should make it clear to 
administrators that courses improving quantitative reasoning skills are 
important and hold their professors accountable for working through 
the numerical aspects of cases. They should struggle to understand 
what a calculation means, what assumptions are behind a statistic, 
and how a formula acts across the range of applicable scenarios. Most 
of all, they should ask for clarification without apology: ultimately 
each law student is responsible for ensuring he receives the numerical 
training and exposure he needs for the successful practice of law. 
With this background, lawyers will enter the field with the skills 
they need to understand and soundly use numerical information. Once 
in practice, lawyers should utilize experts to ensure that legal 
outcomes reflect good math.199 Moreover, they should take care to 
understand numerical evidence just as they work to understand all 
other types of evidence presented and be cautious of introducing 
statistical evidence they do not fully understand.  
199. Similarly, Professor Daniel Rubinfeld has suggested that courts appoint 
neutral experts as needed to advise on technical and statistical matters 
based on an arbitration model. See Rubinfeld, supra note 90, at 1095; 
see also Meyerson & Meyerson, supra note 17, at 775 (“On more subtle 
points of mathematics or science, it would be appropriate for judges to 
turn to experts to help identify whether proposed evidence is ‘good 
science.’ ”). 
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It is time that we stop pretending that numbers and math are not 
important in the practice of law. As lawyers, lawmakers, law 
professors, and law students, we need to take responsibility for 
illuminating the meanings hiding in the shadows of numerical 
information. 
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Appendix 
Survey of Numerically Focused Law Classesa 
Law School Numerically Focused Classes Offered 
Appalachian School of Lawb None 
Ave Maria School of Lawc None 
Baylor Law Schoold Basic Tax & Accounting for Lawyers 
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Lawe None 
California Western School of Lawf Accounting for Lawyers 
Campbell Law Schoolg None 
Columbia Law Schoolh 
Financial Statement Analysis & 
Interpretation 
Statistics for Lawyers 
Drake University Law Schooli None 
Dwayne O. Andreas School of Lawj 
(Barry University) 
None 
Florida State University College of Lawk None 
Harvard Law Schooll 
Analytical Methods for Lawyers 
Applied Quantitative Analysis 
Financial Statement Analysis 
Fundamentals of Statistical Analysis 
Introduction to Accounting & 
Corporate Financial Reports 
John Marshall Law Schoolm  
(Atlanta, GA) 
Accounting for Lawyers 
Loyola Marymount Universityn  
(Los Angeles, CA) 
Accounting for Income Taxes 
Accounting for Lawyers 
New York University School of Lawo 
Accounting for Lawyers 
Accounting for Tax Consequences 
Quantitative Methods in Law I 
Quantitative Methods in Law II 
Pacific McGeorge School of Lawp Accounting for Lawyers 
Saint Louis University School of Lawq None 
SMU Dedman School of Lawr Tax Accounting 
Stanford Law Schools 
Accounting 
Research Design for Empirical Legal 
Studies 
Texas Tech University School of Lawt Accounting for Lawyers 
Tulane University Law Schoolu None 
University of Chicago Law Schoolv 
Advanced Law & Economics 
Financial Accounting for Lawyers 
Fundamentals of Accounting for 
Attorneys 
Villanova Law Schoolw Accounting for Lawyers 
West Virginia University College of Lawx None 
Yale Law Schooly Legal Accounting 
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a. The table includes classes offered at schools ranked 1–6, 51–56, and 101–106 
in U.S. News & World Reports’ 2012 law school rankings and the first six 
schools alphabetically of those that are unranked. See Best Law Schools, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews. 
com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/law-rankings (last visited Jan. 
13, 2013). Classes emphasizing the development of numerical analysis or 
mathematical skills are included; those only incidentally employing math 
are not. In a few cases, two sections of the same class were offered 
during the surveyed period; in each case, such duplicative offerings were 
counted only once. All web addresses listed in this Appendix were last 
visited February 13, 2013. 
b. 2011–2012 Catalog, Appalachian Sch. Law, http://www.asl.edu/Documents/ 
Student%20Services/Admissions/2011-2012%20ASL%20Catalog.pdf. 
c. Course Descriptions, Ave Maria Sch. Law, http://legacy.avemarialaw. 
edu/index.cfm?event=academics.coursedescriptions. 
d. Curriculum Information, Baylor L. Sch., http://www.baylor.edu/law/ 
ps/index.php?id=75581; Schedule of Classes, BAYLOR L. SCH., https:// 
www1.baylor.edu/scheduleofclasses/Results.aspx?TermCC=20&Term=1
21&College=LW&Prefix=LAW&StartCN=&EndCN=&Status=&Days
=&Instructor=&IsMini=false. 
e. Upper-Level Courses — Fall 2011, Cardozo Sch. Law, http://www. 
cardozo.yu.edu/uploadedFiles/Cardozo/Info_For/Current_Students/Fall-
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